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INTIMATIONS OF IMMORTALITY IN THE THOUGHT OF JESUS

THE INGERSOLL LECTURE FOR 1959

HENRY J. CADBURY
HAVERFORD, PENNSYLVANIA

THE historic Ingersoll lectureship on the Immortality of Man requires of the lecturer both some legitimate extension of its terms and some necessary limitation of his field. One is justified in supposing that the pious layman who planned the foundation was not thinking in highly technical terms, but like laymen of our day was thinking of a widely shared belief in the *post mortem* survival or revival of those who die. If he had wished to specify the indiscriminate persistence of the individual as a philosophical tenet of the nature of man, he could well have used the more familiar term — the immortality of the soul. On the other hand, if he had wished to be faithful to the wording of much of the Bible and to the Church's creeds, he would have spoken of the Resurrection of the Dead.

Earlier lecturers have taken the liberty of dealing with the nearest analogue to one or other of these concepts in a great variety of cultural situations. It has seemed to me not more out of bounds to inquire into what little evidence we have of the thought of Jesus in this area. The word immortality was perhaps not even known to him. It is scarcely an Aramaic concept. Even the whole Greek New Testament has the classical term but two or three times. What Jesus did apparently think of man's future, where his views are likely to have come from, and particularly in what kind of context they seemed to him signficant are questions that are worthy of the brief mention that the present occasion permits.

Without overshadowing this limited subject I find it necessary or at least desirable to deal in advance and at some length with

some modern and even some early Christian perspectives that are unlikely to have been shared by Jesus himself in order that we may be in a position to conjecture and to contrast his own way of thinking. To do so one must speak in somewhat general terms of the New Testament as a whole, a much more unhomogeneous body of thought, and of some problems of its interpretation. The disproportion of such prefatory matters may be remedied by the brevity with which the central subject can be presented.

A year ago in the Cambridge subway I was struck by an advertisement: "You don't need eyes to see God." I soon concluded it was not merely another text of religious propaganda, but a solicitation for medical purposes. I recalled that a friend of mine who had died lately in a Boston hospital had donated her eyes for transplanting to the living blind, and closer inspection of the small print of the notice confirmed my conjecture with the words "Write or telephone to the Boston Eye Bank."

What interested me was the religious implication of the notice. It had been used, I learned, with the consent of the local churches, including especially the Roman Catholic. It was also used presumably with the assumption that it would have meaning to the travelling public, beyond mere church affiliation. Since the latest Gallup Poll to which I have access reported that 96% of the people of America believe in God and 76% believe in a life after death, the general acceptability of the slogan could be taken for granted.

Yet I can hardly believe it represents a clear or uniform view on the part of those who accept the slogan or who increasingly answer Dr. Gallup's questions in the affirmative. The Biblical teaching is not clear whether either here or hereafter anyone sees God with these eyes. They are rather a figure of speech for what American theologians were calling a few years ago New Eyes for Invisibles or Eyes of Faith.[1] It should be easy for us therefore to imagine a similar undefinedness in the first century church among those who at that time took for granted both the belief in God and the belief in life after death.

The New Testament root of the latter was primarily the Jewish resurrection belief. This was based on the eschatological view of history such as is found in the books we call apocalypses. It is

[1] Titles of books by Rufus M. Jones, 1943, and Paul S. Minear, 1946, respectively.

doubtful whether it occurs in the older books like Job and the Psalms,[2] though passages from both have been taken in the later sense, much as in the New Testament certain passages which do imply resurrection have had read into them the quite different doctrine of immortality. One Old Testament book, Koheleth, or Ecclesiastes, seems definitely to deny after life — in spite of the glorious, though perhaps mistranslated, text, "He hath set eternity in their heart" (3:11).

If historical and critical studies are to be trusted, it was first in the Maccabean period that a special situation gave rise to a resurrection belief. There was a new hope of a better day near at hand. It was precipitated by persecution as hope often is, but the persecution raised a special problem. The martyrs who had been most loyal of all were likely to miss the consummation while the lukewarm or the lucky survivors might share it. The book of Daniel by a leap of faith, trusting in God's justice, declares: "Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt" (12:2).

There is a curious parallel in what is perhaps our oldest extant Christian document, 1 Thessalonians. Again the hope of a near dénouement burned with special brightness. Its imminence was calculated (as in Daniel), perhaps overcalculated. In the expectant group at Thessalonica some already had died. In addition to other reasons for sorrow their surviving friends saw no justice in their being cheated of the common Christian reward. So Paul consoles them with assurance:

> But we would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope. For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep. For this we declare to you by the word of the Lord, that we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the Lord, shall not precede those who have fallen asleep. For the Lord himself will descend from heaven with a cry of command, with the archangel's call, and with the sound of the trumpet of God. And the dead in Christ will rise first; then we who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air; and so we shall always be with

[2] Cf. most recently C. S. Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms, 1958, Chapter 5.

> the Lord. Therefore comfort one another with these words (1 Thessalonians 4:13–18 RSV).

As Paul says elsewhere (1 Cor. 15:18), without such a promise one must conclude that those who have fallen asleep in Christ, i.e. deceased Christians, have perished.

Thus in both Old Testament and New Testament the resurrection belief enters as an exception, as a problem of a minority. But with the apocalyptic hope deferred the minority who have died or will die becomes a majority. What was exceptional was universalized, at least by one influential sect, the Pharisees, and by Christians including perhaps in time Paul himself.

Another factor in the New Testament is the belief in the resurrection of Jesus. The relation of this to the wider belief is ambiguous. In fact the term resurrection is today often used confusedly, meaning now the individual instance of Jesus, now the anticipation of a wider occurrence. One is a past event, one is future. The past event is treated as a foretaste, or first fruits, of the future. Paul uses it as assurance of the future — briefly in 1 Thessalonians, more at length in 1 Corinthians. Whether he regarded it as occurring in the same form as the future one — and it is this which he principally is discussing in 1 Cor. 15 — one cannot tell. If he did, the accounts in the gospels hardly agree with him. In fact, their view of the same body, scars and all, flesh and bones (Luke 24:39; John 20:25, 27; contrast "flesh and blood cannot inherit," etc. 1 Cor. 15:50) is antithetical to what Paul says of the more general resurrection. The Corinthians who cavilled at Paul's teaching as incredible would find little satisfaction in the resurrection stories in the Gospels if they met them currently in circulation or read them later.

The experiences that led early Christians to believe Jesus was risen are obscure. They may have been partly related to the future expectation current in apocalyptic circles. If he was soon to take part as they expected in a final rôle it was natural to think he would rise ultimately, or indeed had risen and was in the interim *Messias absconditus*. More decisive for such a belief would be any kind of vivid sense that Jesus was still or again in contact with them — visible in heaven (Stephen in Acts), or on earth, or au-

dible in dreams or visions (Paul in Acts). Even these are only causes for inferences to be made that he had risen. Whether the stories of the empty grave are inferences from these or whether the beliefs in his resurrection are inferences from the empty grave is uncertain. All these beliefs could arise in any order and would tend in the end to confirm one another.

Behind any or all of these is doubtless the current Jewish belief in resurrection of some people — not any belief in immortality, nor indeed a general resurrection nor what we should call today parapsychology or spiritualism. Whatever experience or convictions the first Christians had in connection with the Jesus who had been crucified would be conditioned by the current abstract resurrection belief if it were at all possible, and would be interpreted in its terms.

Conversely this single episode when so interpreted would immensely strengthen that same resurrection belief. It seemed to Paul in 1 Cor. 15 and elsewhere, and to his biographer in Acts, the strongest assurance. For others than Jesus resurrection was in the future, hence uncertain. With Jesus it was in the past, and "only the past is secure." But, along with the Holy Spirit, it was a guarantee of the future. Both of them are called "first fruits." The resurrection of Jesus sets the pattern for other cases. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." What Jesus and Paul and their contemporaries had come to accept in the abstract, now after Easter because of this single concrete instance, became more credible and more assured. Unlike the Jews, the Christians now could argue with more assurance for the extension of one certified phenomenon. What God had done God could do. This was a method of argument that non-Christian Jews and pagans could not withstand. Their only defense was to doubt or deny the resurrection of Jesus. Probably on this rather than on the general belief the controversy turned.

If what has been said in the preceding paragraphs is correct, we get something very much like arguing in a circle. If the *post mortem* experience of Jesus was interpreted in terms of the Jewish belief in the resurrection of the just, then the Christian belief in the latter rested in turn at least in part upon the former as so interpreted. Such a circular process ought not to disturb us or

surprise us. Our trouble is that when we look at a group of long established beliefs we tend to forget their genetic character. Though we cannot always at this late date determine the sequence of their origin we should be prepared to believe that they once were either inferences from or presuppositions of one another. Their logical consistency is due precisely to this human process rather than to a more objective foundation. In such circumstances it becomes quite easy to argue in a circle, if that is the right way to describe the matter.

The effect of the belief in Jesus' resurrection on the early Christian belief in the wider resurrection experience can hardly be overestimated. It was the kind of assurance, contemporary and concrete, that the most ardent though speculative convictions of Pharisees or other non-Christian Jews could not have equalled. And it has played a major rôle in the continuing Christian hope.

But before leaving this factor in the subject one should remember how complicated were the forces at work in connection with the early Easter story. Even without the uncongenial or irreconcilable spiritualizing presentation by Paul the gospel narratives themselves suggest contradiction or combination of more than one point of view or motive. The apologetic element is obvious, though like much apologetic of all kinds it tends to be inconsistent or even contradictory. The details given look sometimes like afterthoughts more than like the original sources of the convictions. This does nothing to reduce our certainty that Jesus' resurrection was firmly believed in, nor does it necessarily affect our historical judgment about what actually did or did not happen. There was no clear pattern in the underlying Jewish anticipation that would force the Christian story of Jesus' resurrection into a ready made mould.

There were in fact other aspects of Judaism which both before and after the events of Easter the first Christians shared. (1) One of these was quite different from any resurrection belief — the belief that in individual instances men had escaped death altogether. They were quite literally immortal — not in the sense that having died once they would live forever, but in the sense that they had not died and perhaps would not die. Instead of death and descent into Sheol they had experienced removal — ascen-

sion, assumption, rapture, are the names theology has used — and the instances first noted by the Jews and Christians, though differently described, are Enoch, Elijah, and probably Moses. Elements of such belief are closely associated with Christian views of the resurrection, whether that of Jesus or that of Christians in general. In both of these real death was taken for granted. Indeed orthodox Christianity was concerned to stress — perhaps against docetism — that Jesus really died (Ignatius), and was buried (Paul, the Creeds), instead of being removed at once from the cross (Gospel of Peter) or before the cross to God and heaven. Instead of such prompt assumption, opportunity for appearances of the risen Jesus was required in a period of sojourn on earth whether forty days (Acts) or some briefer or much longer period. The ascension belief was not fully rejected. It was added to resurrection belief. It is implied not only in the explicit narrative in Acts 1, but in other passages of Luke-Acts, in John and Paul. There is no clear distinction between appearances of the risen Jesus that assume he has already been thus exalted and those which at least by context defer such exaltation.

(2) Another aspect of pre-Christian belief which fits very neatly here and which also had, I believe, much to do with the Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus is the expectation of the coming of the Messiah. In the nature of the case this expectation had no fixed features in Judaism, and various forms of it are reflected in the Gospels. Certainly some people held that when he came it would be after prior existence and not completely *de novo* and others that the place from which he came was not a matter of general knowledge. Now early after Jesus' death and perhaps before, he was identified with this coming Messiah, and it was therefore natural that his availability for this future rôle should be indicated. Of course availability did not require an immediate resurrection. Fourth Ezra, a Jewish writing probably of the first Christian century, speaks of the Messiah as remaining dead for a long period. But the Christian church while it looked for the *parousia* in the rather imminent future found in the view that the Messiah had been promptly raised (Does "the third day" of 1 Cor. 15:4 and elsewhere not emphasize this promptness?) an assurance of this eschatological hope. Jesus was immediately available in

the sense that he was not in Sheol or in the grave, but was in heaven or at God's right hand, whence in any case the events of the last day were likely to be initiated. Thus the eschatological hope of Judaism was a conditioning factor not only for the pre-Christian and Christian belief in the plural resurrection "at the last day" but also for the particular Christian belief in the individual and exceptional prior resurrection of Jesus.

Perhaps the dependence of these Christian beliefs on the primitive Jewish-Christian eschatology is not generally realized by modern believers. This is, however, a minor embarrassment compared with the fact that the very notion of Messiahship is dependent on the same circle of ideas, and with it the core for any superlative view of the person and work of Jesus Christ. Insofar as the primitive eschatology is outgrown or abandoned as myth, we must admit that modern beliefs in the significance of Jesus of Nazareth and also beliefs in his or our after life are by-products or survivals or developments of the archaic and outmoded dreams of the apocalyptic dreamers. There is nothing unusual in the persistence of partial elements of myth when the myth as a whole is discredited. If they persist by sheer inertia that is natural. But the thoughtful or conscientious Christian today will welcome the discovery of this ancestry in order that he may inquire further into the motives of their origin and the relevance of those motives for today.

Before we attempt to do so something should be said about the word myth. It is somewhat ambiguous and is perhaps unnecessarily offensive. It is used of stories of the past, connected with religion, and aiming to explain the origin of beliefs or practices. This is not the sense in which I have employed it. It is also used of the future, of dreams or prophecies of what from the time of the mythmaker is yet to take place. In the nature of things the imaginative factor is in such predictions peculiarly strong. Actually they rarely use much of the available data for conjecturing what will probably happen. They are even more fallible than political forecasts based on public opinion polls or than weather predictions made by scientific meteorologists. If they have validity it must be credited to the supernatural foresight of inspired proph-

ets and seers. Natural calculation or astute insight would rarely be an acceptable explanation to religious believers in these myths.

There is a third sense in which today theologians seem to use the word or the root, though not of the narrative content of an idea so much as of its framework. It means the *Weltanschauung* in which people express themselves, whether about things past, things contemporary, or things future. Demythicizing (demythologizing) is the attempt to strip away from religious thought such elements as belong to transient and unscientific cosmology or psychology. In the former belongs the three story universe, the earth with heaven above and hell beneath, in the second belong the mythical beings like demons and angels.

If this process is justified as applied to narratives in the Gospels of the New Testament which appear to have a kernel of history, we can hardly object if it is applied to the purely futuristic ideas of life after death. That the dead become angels and exist in heaven would be the kind of mythical views that would be the first to disappear at the hands of modern demythologizing. Probably we are quite prepared to surrender heaven as a place literally in the sky, and the angels as corporeal beings with or without wings. The purpose of demythologizing is to remove the shell of such notions in order that the spiritual values can be preserved and translated into terms congenial to our own *Weltanschauung*, and existential, that is, relevant to our need.

One cannot, however, resist the temptation to ask why do we stop the process of removal just where these scholars do. If some of the furnishings of religious setting in the past happen to be more congenial to the present, are they thereby the more real? Are not myth and symbol almost universal in religion? almost inevitable? The presence of the naïve and archaic in parts of the New Testament language ought rather to warn us of the same element of myth in the rest, even though we find it easier to accept.

"Poetry," writes a modern literary critic, "is the imaginative dominion over experience." The same can be said for religion. Religion tends to personalize and materialize its contents. It operates through dramatization. Beside angels and demons it has other characters, *dramatis personae*, God, Jesus, Satan, with whom men have to do. Their relationship to us is conceived much as of

actors on a stage. The myth of *Heilsgeschichte* is an imaginative narration of describable transactions. It can be as definite as the plot of a novel, and fiction in turn can be as objective and realistic as the prose facts of history.

There are children who are particularly addicted to fantasy. With or without the use of dolls they live at times in a make-believe world of fictitious characters living in human fashion, with all the characteristic features of events in experience. Perhaps this persistence of imagination is one of the charming features of childhood that Wordsworth had in mind in his famous ode. And imagination naturally plays its part in thinking of life after death. But we must recognize precisely that it is imagination and that its figures are taken — whether mystical or existentialist — from other scenes. As it was in the days of Noah, so shall it be in the days of the Son of Man, and so it is in childhood's fantasy: they eat, they drink, they buy and sell, they marry or are given in marriage. I am not concerned now to challenge the legitimacy and value of all such symbolic aspects of religion. It is only fair to ask that they be recognized, and recognized within the cautious line of what is called reality as well as beyond it.

It has already been mentioned that demythologizing is somewhat destructive of certain categories of space, the ancient Semitic view of a universe in layers. But another ancient category and one not obsolete is the category of time. Our Jewish-Christian tradition is especially given to this. One need merely be reminded of the use of age, or ages. Time extends from the age to the ages of the ages. Life for men is in this age and then in the age to come. History may be described in the book of reigns (as the Greek entitles our Book of Kings). The supreme ideal is described in a time word, — the reign of God. It is perhaps characteristic of the difference between the Hellenic and Semitic, that when they symbolize value concretely the former tends to do so geographically, the latter chronologically.

In Christianity both ancient and modern the category of time has played a large part. Religion is understood as revealed in history. God deals with men in successive dispensations, and is known by his actions in time. The past set of covenants which form the framework of the Pentateuch share this outlook as does

the simpler division of history that one finds in Paul. In the first the events are the Sabbath (Creation), kosher food (Noah), circumcision (Abraham), the final law (Moses). For Paul the intervals are "from Adam to Moses," from Moses to Christ, and until Christ's return.

In modern Christianity the same temporal representations are favorite. The concept of evolution has made them attractive to liberal and secular thinkers. There is little criticism of the linear concept of the Old Testament or New as applied to time to match the demythologizing of the spatial concepts of vertically separated levels. In general "Biblical theology" seems to have given the time element a new lease of life. Cullmann's title "Christ and Time"[3] is topical, and so are the overtones of phrases like *Heilsgeschichte* and "Christ event." Von Hugel described the Fourth Gospel quite differently. He says of it, "There is everywhere a striving to contemplate history *sub specie aeternitatis* and to englobe the successiveness of men in the simultaneity of God."[4] But John seems not to have many followers. The successiveness of men is not objected to. *Post mortem* existence does not conflict with standards of myth widely acceptable today and not requiring substitution. Any discussion of immortality must emphasize that in every form it is a conception subject to the common human category of sense of time.

This unquestioned acceptability in many quarters is all the more striking since pre-existence — projecting from man's visible existence in the other direction — is one of the things that some of our demythologizing friends have ruled out. For the same reason they must be willing to exclude a *post mortem* existence both for Jesus and at the last day for those who believe in him. If they find currently unacceptable the view held by more than one New Testament writer that before Jesus' birth or incarnation he had enjoyed a noteworthy existence comparable to his later exaltation the latter must be rejected also. The two belong together. Interestingly enough, Wordsworth accepted as an intimation of future immortality precisely what he called "intimations" of pre-natal existence.

[3] See the excellent unpublished paper, The Biblical View of Time by James Muilenburg.

[4] Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. John, Gospel of St.

Actually contemporary theologians — and I name no names — are not agreed as to where the demythologizing should begin and end. The imaginative spheres to which the expression of religious experience are transposed include several, — chronology, theology and anthropology, as well as cosmology. Which of these categories may we retain in the primitive New Testament form, and which must be demythologized? Unconsciously we tend to retain part and revise part. Each person wishes to salvage what seems meaningful to himself. To others the full biblical *Weltanschauung* appears to be a kind of seamless robe to be either accepted or rejected in its entirety.

The need for demythologizing the futurist hope of the first Christians was evidently felt, if not expressed, in an early period of Christian history. For ultimately and in some respects quite soon much of it was translated to other forms of expression; if one may use the word, it was remythologized. Something like the Greek Platonic view of immortality unconsciously modified the expression of normative Jewish resurrection beliefs. We suspect this already in Paul, as we are reasonably sure of it in Josephus's description of Pharisaism. But as often happens, the old and new continued side by side in uneasy juxtaposition, and without the thorough supremacy of either view. The gradual increase of the immortality concept can no doubt be traced, and its reasons understood. The parallel persistence of the doctrine of bodily resurrection, not merely because of the authority of the New Testament and the Creeds but also because of human nature's craving for the familiar assurance of sensory phenomena, is also intelligible.

There are both advantages and disadvantages in focussing our inquiry upon the teachings of Jesus. The advantages are these: Whatever he thought or felt about the future during his ministry is little likely to have been influenced by his own later resurrection. For his followers, as we have already noted, this event, accepted as a past fact of experience, had a great influence when they looked backward or when they looked forward to the more general resurrection in the future. Our Synoptic Gospels record sayings of Jesus anticipating that he would not only be killed, but also would "rise

after three days."[5] But the genuineness of the sayings may be doubted, or in any case the effect of the actual event is not likely to have acted in advance on the mind of Jesus or the minds of those who heard him. Only afterwards did the individual event that was past play a part in visualizing and confirming the collective event that was future, as indeed it affected nearly every phase of Christian thinking.

Before his death Jesus and his disciples were spared the problem that has bothered men ever since, even down to the recent publication of a teacher in this school,[6] the relation of a resurrection conceived as an historical event to future theological belief. Epistemology seems to ask more difficult questions about actual events than about merely anticipated events.

Furthermore Jesus unlike us moderns, though not unlike his early followers, found little difficulty with the miracle involved in resurrection from the dead. That it was or would be supernatural rather than natural, if one may use a distinction scarcely known to him, he very likely took for granted. Several stories of individuals raised from the dead by Jesus or Peter or Paul are reported by the Synoptic writers much as are the stories of miraculous cure of the sick. For the whole of the New Testament we may be sure that the all-penetrating theism of the outlook on nature and history, left unraised the question whether resurrection from the dead was an automatic process inherent in the constitution of man, as in some other cultures the continuance of immortal souls is felt to be. On the contrary it was believed that only God could give power to raise the dead, and Jesus and his contemporaries even in their more critical moods, were little concerned to question the possibility of what God had done and would do.

Finally Jesus' views of after life are unlikely to have been affected by what we call the Greek conception. Some Jews of that general period, through contact with things unsemitic, may have been influenced by the doctrine of immortality. It is more likely to be found in the Apocrypha of the Old Testament and in Jewish

[5] Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:34. The parallels say "on the third day," and, in Matthew, "be raised." In general resurrection is expressed in the New Testament as "from the dead" (ἐκ νεκρῶν) not "of the dead."

[6] R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason, 1957.

apocalypses than in the Hebrew or rabbinic writings. I think Greek influence on Ecclesiastes has not been made out.

What concerns us here is the probability that Jesus himself was less likely to conflate with Jewish conceptions of resurrection alien parallels than were Paul, the authors of Hebrews and of John, and even than the authors of Luke-Acts and of the other Synoptic Gospels. How alien, not to say mutually exclusive, the two concepts are to each other was brought to our attention by Professor Cullmann in his recent Ingersoll Lecture. And it is well to remind ourselves of the clear-cut words of Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho, lxxx. written after a full century of Christianity:

> If you have met with some so-called Christians who do not accept this (resurrection and millenium) but dare to blaspheme the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob who affirm that there is no resurrection of the dead but that when they die their souls are taken up to heaven, do not suppose that they are Christians. . . . But I and any Christians who are orthodox on all points know that there will be a resurrection of the flesh, etc.

The disadvantages of focussing our attention upon Jesus' view of the after life are also obvious. His thought must if possible be discovered behind the reported sayings in the Gospels, especially the first three of them. This is a familiar difficulty whenever one seeks to get at his mind on any subject. But it is not only the ultimate evangelist that has to be allowed for. Between him and Jesus oral if not written tradition has been at work, altering and varying the original viewpoint. This accounts for most of the apparent discrepancies among the Synoptic sayings of Jesus, since the single units of tradition had passed through different media in the process. Even the original expressions of Jesus might well have seemed to us obscure or contradictory as do those of Paul from whom we have first hand records in his genuine letters. In the case of Jesus unresolved variations of viewpoint about the after life are fully as apparent.

Beside all this we shall find the amount of relevant material rather scanty. No matter how abundant Jesus' references to the future appear to be — and none of the devices of scholarship has yet succeeded in reducing the extent to which we have come to

recognize the futuristic element in the teaching of Jesus — on certain aspects of that future Jesus has in our records less to say than might have been expected. The resurrection as distinct from the judgment is not often separately described, nor is the nature of life after the judgment. As in many other Christian sources much less is said of the fate of the condemned than of the blessed, and much less about individuals than about groups.

This paucity of clear exposition is intelligible if we are right in thinking that whatever our temporary focus now may be it was not a major concern of Jesus to expound or reassert the views of the future life which he held or shared. His references to it are mainly incidental, and associated in a subordinate way with his major interests. This is increasingly clear of the whole complex of ideas which we call eschatology to which our present subject belongs. Even the Kingdom of God for all its frequency of mention in our records is not the central concern of the Gospels. The same may be said of the resurrection or "eternal life." Their mention is nearly always incidental to something else.

Perhaps this is most readily illustrated in the Beatitudes, where we have in each sentence first a selected quality or condition for which men are to be congratulated and then in the second line of each couplet a variety of expressions of reward, — "Theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven" (twice), "They shall see God," "They shall be called sons of God," "Your reward is great in heaven." Not all the references are *post mortem*, though some plainly are, and others are ambiguous or indecisive in their implications of time. Insofar as they are *post mortem* they refer to reward or punishment, to advantage or disadvantage, to gain or loss. They are parallel to incidental references of more immediate results to the living.

On the resurrection itself Jesus once is represented as being drawn out in debate. The passage occurs in Mark and is reproduced in Matthew and Luke in evident dependence upon Mark (Mark 12:18–27; Matt. 22:23–33; Luke 20:27–38). The passage belongs to the category and to the series of test questions. Sadducees, who as a group deny the resurrection, are the questioners and frame a question intended to reduce the idea to absurdity by instancing one woman who by Levirate law for childless

widows had been married in turn to seven brothers. The question is asked, Whose wife will she be in the resurrection? (Incidentally this is perhaps the first place in the Bible where monogamy is most definitely assumed.)

Jesus' reply plainly accepts and argues for the doctrine of the resurrection. It disposes of the supposed assumption of plural marriage by declaring that when they rise from the dead they neither marry nor are given in marriage but are like angels in heaven. (Again it may seem odd that the clearest descriptive datum of the future life in the Gospels is the absence of marriage —a view which some of the rabbis shared though others denied.) In the reply Jesus also meets not the specific instance but the scepticism about the resurrection belief by declaring that his questioners are wrong because they "know neither the scriptures nor the power of God." These are both of them points made by the rabbis in debate. God's power to raise the dead, they claim, is no greater than his power to create men by birth — an *a fortiori* argument that must be accepted. This is not explicitly included in the Gospel passage. But it does include a typical argument from scripture:

> But as for the dead being raised, have you not read in the book of Moses, in the passage about the Bush, how God said to him "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob?" He is not God of the dead but of the living. You are quite wrong.

The argument here is characteristically Jewish.[7] The rabbis, and I think other Jews and Christians, deduced contemporaneity of Moses with the patriarchs from pronouns and tenses and other grammatical phenomena in the texts of scripture. What God said to Moses involves survival or revival for Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It is because they anticipated this future that according to Hebrews 11:16 "God is not ashamed to be called their God." Similarly according to the Gospel of John 8:56 Abraham had seen the day of Christ.

This single synoptic passage is in its general tenor self-evidently Jewish. It clearly puts Jesus on the side of the belief in resurrection along with the Pharisees, the rabbis, and presumably the weight

[7] See my Peril of Modernizing Jesus, 1937, pp. 59 f., 61–63, with notes.

of official Judaism going back as far as the second benediction in the daily prayer of Eighteen (Shemoneh Esreh). I see no reason why this Jewishness, or this concern for a theological question unusual in these Gospels (but compare the discussion of the Messiah's sonship in the very next section) should lead us to doubt the correctness of its ascription to Jesus of an acceptance of current ideas. At least he was no Sadducee. Luke who makes some changes in the words of Jesus here does not pass beyond the range of current Jewish speculation.

The other and minor references to the subject of future life do not match this one synoptic passage in directness or explicitness. They are, as has been said, incidental. Only once again is any general resurrection mentioned, though it is described as the resurrection of the righteous. At Luke 14:14, in a passage comparing the result of dinner invitations extended respectively to one's associates or equals and to the underprivileged, Jesus explains that the first will return the invitation while the others cannot, but "you will be repaid at the resurrection of the just." The reference here to the righteous only cannot be pressed since the same evangelist elsewhere writes that "there will be a resurrection of both the righteous and the unrighteous" (Acts 24:15).

There is also in Luke (16:19–31) the parable of the rich man and Lazarus where, as in some of the Beatitudes, and especially in the woes and beatitudes of Luke, compensation is conspicuous rather by way of reversal or equalization than as reward and punishment. As Abraham said to the rich man, "Son, remember that you in your lifetime received your good things and Lazarus in like manner evil things; but now he is comforted here and you are in anguish."

This parable is noteworthy in other respects; the situation is pictured prior to any resurrection. Both of the deceased have been transported promptly to Hades, where they occupy two compartments separated by "a great gulf" but not preventing intercommunication. One is pleasant, the bosom of Abraham, the other a place of torment with the anguish of flame.

It is worthwhile to pause here to remind ourselves how often Abraham or all three of the patriarchs represent in Christian documents the charter members, or the hosts, or the primary examples

of the resurrection experience. Beside this reference to Abraham as presiding over the situation between Dives and Lazarus, we have already mentioned the answer of Jesus to the Sadducees in Mark 12 and parallels and the passages in John 8 and in Hebrews 11 and from a later period the statement of Justin Martyr that to deny the resurrection is to blaspheme the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob. There is also the earlier saying Matt. 8:11 (cf. Luke 13:28, from Q ?) which anticipates the same three as the nucleus of membership in the Kingdom of God: "I tell you many will come from east and west and will recline at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven." Perhaps the same reason underlies the mention of the same three in Acts 3:13 in a context referring ("glorified"; "raised from the dead") to the resurrection of Jesus. Assurance in the resurrection of the patriarchs, though differently arrived at from the assurance in the resurrection of Jesus, seems to have served in Judaism and Jewish Christianity the same purpose as "first fruits" which that of Jesus did later.

The concept of reward or punishment undeferred at death recurs also in another Lucan passage where Jesus on the cross says to the penitent thief, "Today you will be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23:43).

This is not the place for the collection and minute examination of all synoptic passages relevant to our topic. That has been done by others and it leaves a confused and contradictory impression. Not even when the words of Jesus are compared with the more abundant Jewish materials and are found to coincide with them, whether from the apocalypses, from the Hellenistic writings, or from Talmud and Midrash, is the situation much better. Evidently the several sources exercised much freedom in imagining the subject, in recasting and varying the imagery. Even matters of place and time, or places and times, in the *post mortem* experience of the dead were not consistently plotted and mapped. The reasons can be easily guessed, — the inherent unreality of the subject, the consequent conjecture and inference based on the equally fragmentary and unprecise statements in scripture, and the fusion of ideals of collective or national destiny with the problems of individual fate. There is inevitable vacillation between what is con-

ceived as happening to the individual at once after death, and what occurs simultaneously to all men at the time of the final judgment. Approximate differentiation of good and evil men seems desirable both at once and ultimately. Hence one gets in other sources such implications or combinations as a first and a second death, a first and second resurrection, the days of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God. Whether the scene of these events is the earth as we know it or as it will be transformed, or elsewhere — Hades, Gehenna, heaven, paradise or "the eternal habitations" (Luke 16:9) — is equally ambiguous.

Even if we had more words of Jesus on the subject and if we were sure they were all correctly reported one may doubt whether they would add up to a blueprint that would carry even for the devout believer a satisfying and authoritative picture as of a principal concern of Jesus' teaching. The very incidental character of the references suggests alike two almost contradictory conclusions.

1. The after life was taken for granted by Jesus and by his hearers generally. He did not need to impress it or correct it. It was not for him or them a question of hesitation and debate. It is therefore an assured ingredient of his perspective.

2. By the same token his allusions do not allow us to reconstruct any very definite or circumstantial impression of this future. They were innocently unprecise, intimations rather than descriptions, and were employed in connection with other matters on which Jesus had something emphatic and significant to say.

In other words, the more sure we are that Jesus in fact accepted the perspective of those who believe in future existence, the more evident it seems that it was not the center of his interest but was thought of and felt as relevant to questions of here and now. For him and for us it was part of the morrow about which neither he nor we need be anxious. If death of the body is not to be feared, if one is to go his way today and tomorrow whatever the third day has in store, there is no need for the comforting thoughts of an after life to banish the fear of death. We have lately had from the pen of John Knox a very honest inquiry into the problem of knowing what Jesus' death meant in anticipation to Jesus himself.[8] It will be more difficult to answer a like question about his personal

[8] John Knox, The Death of Christ, 1958, Chapter 5.

and private employment of any anticipation of survival or revival. Our oldest records report primarily what was extrovert about him, and I think we must confine ourselves to this aspect of our records if we are to escape the extremes of fanciful imagination.

We cannot assume that the ideas and motives that had marked the origin of the resurrection faith in late Judaism always remained emphatic nor that the meanings that later Christians have found in it were already in the thought of Jesus. Clearly certain English words into which his sayings have been translated have come to have for us connotations that were not in their originals. "Eternal" (*αἰώνιος*) lacked its emphasis upon endlessness, though not on futurity. "Heaven" lacked the modern suggestion of futurity though not of otherworldliness. With one possible exception[9] neither "soul" nor "spirit" is used in the futuristic sense. Just as Jews and Christians have read into Old Testament passages a belief in resurrection that was not there, so more recent Christians have read into New Testament passages a belief in immortality instead of resurrection.

The religious and philosophical values of a future life to Jesus were perhaps less self-centered than they were later. There was an altruistic element in the anxiety of the living about the dead, as we understand the passages already cited from Daniel and 1 Thessalonians. The living needed assurance that the deserving dead would not miss the good things that the righteous living expected, and (in Daniel) that the wicked who had died would not escape the penalty that was their due. Resurrection as distinct from immortality is not the avoidance of death but revival after death. The length of interval between death and revival is not indicated. If Jesus sometimes emphasizes the nearness of the Kingdom he is shortening the interval not so much for the dead as for the many living who would "not taste of death." Obviously this differs a good deal from any modern concern for the situation *after death*.

There is no evidence that for Jesus the after life was regarded as showing that values in this life are durable and therefore precious. Nor on the other hand is it an expression of the opposite of this life with the latter's mutability. It spells neither continuity

[9] Matt. 10:28. Cf. H. B. Sharman, The Teaching of Jesus about the Future, 1909, pp. 267–270.

nor discontinuity, neither unity nor the kind of duality which is so natural in our tendency to contrast the material and the spiritual, the secular and the sacred. Such philosophical approaches are not typical of Jesus.

Today it is a satisfying belief that the future life will have social attractions — the company of those whom we have loved and unimpeded fellowship with God. This ideal is not explicit in the limited gospel material and probably not implicit. There is more if not better company in the wide road that leads to destruction than in the narrow one leading to life. To meet modern tastes one would have to spiritualize such descriptions as we have of dining in the Kingdom of God and to deliteralize the fire in Gehenna and gnashing of teeth in the outer darkness. If Jesus tells the penitent thief, "Today you will be with me in Paradise," the accent is on the place or time not the company.

References to the future life for Jesus as for Judaism in general are connected with the idea of retribution. It may not be clear whether that life itself is retributive to the good alone, or whether resurrection is prior to a judgment at which rewards and penalties are allotted, or mainly a subsequent period in which they are carried out. Whatever the extent or the sequence visualized concerning resurrection, judgment and ultimate *post mortem* experience, these are part of an inseparable group of ideas and have to do with the consequences of our behavior here. Formally at least the future is the sanction for what is recommended now. Insofar as that future is after death, or without death at the *parousia*, or even in the normal nearer sequels in this age — and often the sayings of Jesus put these parallel, or leave them undistinguished — the recommendations are intended to warn or promise. This utilitarian sounding approach would suit the standpoint of his hearers. Jesus' own difference of emphasis would lie in what he recommends, not on why he recommends it. Even sacrificial, disinterested conduct is rarely mentioned by him without appeal to future consequence.

This appeal to the future may have been conventional. Jesus does not seem concerned to give instruction about the future for its own sake. Recommendations on conduct here and now were his main concern. Since he felt these to be valid, self-evident —

or in religious language, the will of God — he was sure they deserved and would receive, sooner or later, due reward, and their opposites likewise the reverse. He may have emphasized the nearness of the end, the shortness of the time and the consequent urgency of right action. In so doing he was not revising the future program, or making special claims for himself, but out of "pastoral" concern was underscoring the importance of the critical choices or changes which men have to make.[10]

Such is the context in which the scattered allusions to man's fate after death occur in the older Gospels. They do not suggest a high degree of otherworldliness. They are related and relevant to behavior in this life. They leave unanswered a whole host of modern questions about the biological and psychological nature of man, about death and consciousness, about personality. They give us little for a Twentieth Century prospectus on the future — even for a tidy First Century eschatology.

More offensive than what they omit is what they imply. The synoptic intimations of a future existence are in the form of sanctions for recommended conduct. No matter how wise and true the ethical standards or the futuristic insights, their association is likely to seem a scandal. One merely cannot say which seems worse to a kind of present day religion. Is it worse that goodness here and now should be recommended by regard for future reward and threat and that disinterested virtue should be associated with practical utilitarian considerations? Or is it worse that the spiritual ideal, which over the centuries has been refined and expressed in terms of the state of the blessed dead, should be debased by being traced back to the crude motivation in this life of escaping future punishment or gaining future rewards?

I understand that some have felt that a recent Ingersoll lecturer described the New Testament faith in the future as the wrong kind.[11] They will perhaps feel that today it is being attributed to "the wrong reason." Yet it is inevitable that this element should

[10] The ethical implications of such sanction are well discussed by A. N. Wilder, Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus, Revised Edition, 1950.

[11] O. Cullmann, "Immortality of the Soul and Resurrection of the Dead: The Witness of the New Testament," Harvard Divinity School Annual Lectures and Book Reviews, No. 21, 1955–6; published also in French, and separately in 1958 in English (London: Epworth Press; New York: The Macmillan Co.).

appear here as it does everywhere else in the Gospels. It has been described as "the perpetual twofold issue of all preaching of the gospel: the offer of mercy and the threat of impending judgement inseparable from it, salvation and destruction, life and death."[12] This, if anything, is an authentic feature of Jesus' teaching.

Can we go any further than this? Or shall we abandon Jesus' eschatology *in toto* as part of outgrown myth and start afresh from the framework of our modern thought, ethical, philosophical and scientific, to construct our own hypothesis concerning a future life?

The paucity and incidental character of Jesus' references can be interpreted as justifying such treatment. It has been suggested that Jesus usually and deliberately was silent on these themes.[13] The answer to the Sadducees may show him impatient of the crudity of the view of the after life without attempting to substitute a more spiritual view. There is a specially striking conclusion — "punch line," in the vernacular — of the story of Dives and Lazarus. When the rich man wishes his surviving brothers warned of the torment of the damned by a messenger actually sent from Hades, he receives the answer, "If they do not hear Moses and the prophets neither will they be convinced if some one should rise from the dead." Twice Dives urges that such a messenger could successfully warn them so that they would repent. Twice Abraham indicates that resurrection has no convincing evidential value, when compared with scriptural warning already available. According to this word, so surprising for any early Christian document, reformed conduct in this life would not be promoted by more convincing evidence of the future life or judgment. What Jesus omits to emphasize in his teaching about the future is no great loss. It would add no useful influence.

Of course we can attempt to find behind his life and teaching presuppositions which at least for us would be logical and valid, though they too may be conventional in his environment. There is the belief in God, who has a will and that will is man's duty.

[12] J. Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, Eng. Trans., 1954, pp. 15 f.

[13] It is noteworthy how often students of this field while admitting that Jesus shared the usual views on resurrection and general eschatology have concluded that "he felt very little interest in them." So, for example, W. G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulfilment, Eng. Trans., 1957, p. 92. Cf. the older statements, as in B. H. Streeter, Immortality, 1917, pp. 122 f.

Those who disobey and those who obey will be treated according to their works. But beside this divine *lex talionis* there are two rather different principles at work. One is the idea that independently of individual merit God in the end equalizes good and bad experience for all men, so that evil now will be balanced with good hereafter and vice versa. This lies behind two passages in Luke. The other is the prophetic emphasis on God's sheer generosity, meting out to men more mercy than they deserve, a kind of divine example of "the second mile." In the theistic framework of Jesus and his contemporaries such theology and theodicy is to be expected.

Another indirect way of adding to the actual data of the Gospels is to make logical deductions of our own about a future life from other features of their story. We can believe that Jesus' ethical teaching shows what we should call the conservation of values, the sacredness of individual personality. There are passages where Jesus seems to predate into this life the eschatology of the future, and not merely to make this life determinative for that future. Thus continuity does occur, but in the reverse direction. Scholars are not agreed as to how far proleptic or "realized" eschatology is implied in Jesus' words. From the early days of the church some have understood that foretastes or intimations of the life to come were to be found in the character and historic career of Jesus, and then and now in the life here on earth of his followers. The more it is possible to expect and recognize in the present the ideal aspects of the life of the future the less important does the prospect of later immortality become. Perfectionism as a present philosophy has usually diverted attention from the future, while emphasis upon moral and spiritual limitations of mankind and ourselves here and now have kindled that hope by sheer contrast. Men will differ as to how far the teaching of Jesus aligns itself with the sturdy expectation that men can and will hear and obey his words, and by obedience in this life will approximate his standards and will merit the future rewards. If Christianity has added little of value to the world's conception of a future life, it has rather offered a partial equivalent in our life here.

The Wordsworthian phrase "intimations of immortality" is not

only a polysyllabic tongue-twister, but also each word is too easily confused, the first with "imitations," as in one edition of Dowden's introduction to the poet's works, the second with "immorality." The phrase is further only partly appropriate for the thought of Jesus. For him the alternatives were continuous living here until the *parousia* and into whatever is in store for men thereafter or else death followed after an interval of unspecified length and character by a general and/or individual experience of being raised from among the dead. In no strict sense is either of these what we usually mean by immortality.

On the other hand, "intimation" is not a bad description of the nature of the Gospel material. According to the dictionary the word means hint, indirect or obscure allusion or suggestion. This is precisely what the Gospels do give us.

What is more, they indicate the context of the references. They are not speculative but practical. They are associated with Jesus' conversations on conduct. To Jesus and his Jewish contemporaries under the Law the urgent problem was not what to believe but what to do. This was the predicament of man to which he addressed himself. He was for his day and outlook a true existentialist.

The outlook was, however, conditioned. Jesus believed in a God who worked miracles and rewarded righteousness. Any future life, like every present life, is the individual work of God. Man as man is not inherently immortal, nor indeed is any part of him. His body and soul both come into being and they both can go out of being and can both come back into being.

Overshadowing any interest in what would befall his hearers if they should die before the *parousia*, and what would happen or had happened to many generations of men who had died was the expectation of what would overtake the living. At least that appears to be the perspective of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels. In John's Gospel this is not so clearly the case. Instead of the many who will not taste of death, we have there Lazarus of Bethany who at least did die and was brought back to life and only the possibility that one unnamed disciple unlike Peter might perhaps tarry until the Lord comes.

The expectation of living on until the *parousia* may be the real

reason why the Gospels say so little of resurrection. It excludes also the usual idea of immortality as following death. In other words, one may say that eschatology of this sort replaces the need for much concern in the subjects appropriate to this lecture, when defined as after death.

I am no expert on the Qumran texts but I do know that they too are heavily surcharged with vivid eschatological pictures, and yet so far as I can tell the published documents have little or no clear reference either to immortality or to resurrection from the dead. It ought not to be attributed to the texts just because Josephus includes in Essene eschatology the immortality of the soul as he does in Pharisaic belief and Hippolytus attributes to the Essenes' faith also resurrection of the body.[14] Perhaps the Qumran documents illustrate how attention when concentrated on apocalyptic hope may leave out as relatively unimportant the question what happens to those who *do* die. I have assumed that the subject of this lecture calls for the latter question. Perhaps I am wrong. In that case immortality should have been construed as including the whole synoptic eschatology and should not have been limited to such passages as imply actual death. The line is confessedly not always clear. But except to modern millenarians the answer of Jesus about those who taste of death would be of more interest than about those who literally will never die. Certainly the first would be at most an intimation of the second.

[14] The material is of course extensive. I refer only to two essays. For the literary sources on the Essenes see Morton Smith, Hebrew Union College Annual xxix, 1958, 273–313; for the absence thus far of convincing evidence of resurrection belief from Qumran see the unpublished thesis of George Wesley Buchanan, Drew University, 1959, The Eschatological Expectations of the Qumran Community, Chapter 5, note 4.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE LUKAN WRITINGS: A RE-ASSESSMENT

H. C. SNAPE

Whalley Vicarage, Blackburn, England

This paper consists of a re-assessment of the composition of the Lukan writings in the light of the hypothesis put forward in recent years by Professor S. G. F. Brandon, Maurice Goguel and H. J. Schoeps.[1] Briefly they claim that the church of Jewish Christians at Jerusalem actively opposed with temporary success Paul's mission proclaiming Jesus as the universal savior, that following the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. the Pauline version of Christianity emerged with new prestige while the primitive Jewish version which survived in Alexandria and, possibly to some extent in Rome, had to adjust itself to this new situation. Mark's gospel in Rome and Matthew's in Alexandria, Professor Brandon argues, are significant witnesses to this adjustment; the Lukan writings, the formation of the Corpus Paulinum, are later witnesses from the Pauline side foreshadowing early Catholicism.

As far as the gospel of Luke is concerned this reconstruction seems to throw some light on the relationship between Matthew and Luke. Both Streeter and Goguel seem to have disallowed the possibility of any relationship between them as lacking any evidence. Goguel writes as follows (Life of Jesus, Allen and Unwin, p. 140), "It has sometimes been suggested that Matthew was used by Luke; more rarely, that Luke influenced Matthew. These two theories seem to us to be untenable, and this for two reasons. First of all, they do not explain the omission by the evangelist, who is regarded as the second, of a whole series of characteristic and important passages given by the first. Further between the two texts there are differences of arrangement which make it very im-

[1] See The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church by S. G. F. Brandon, S.P.C.K., 1951; La Naissance du Christianisme by M. Goguel, Payot, 1946; Eng. trans. The Birth of Christianity, 1951, Allen & Unwin; Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums, H. J. Schoeps, Tubingen, 1949. For a more extensive summary of Brandon's thesis, see Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, Jan., 1954.

probable that there is any direct literary connexion between them." In a footnote he adds, "Especially the fact that in one Gospel elements will be found scattered throughout the work which are grouped together in the other. Facts of this kind are evident, whether we accept the hypothesis that Matthew was the source of Luke or *vice versa*." Goguel does not appear to have thought it possible that one evangelist might omit passages which in one gospel were important to his purpose and characteristic, because (a) they were not consonant with the purpose of the gospel he was compiling and (b), if he included all the matter of the gospel already written together with any fresh matter which had come into his hands, his own composition would have been too lengthy for practical purposes. The fact that "in one gospel elements will be found scattered throughout the work which are grouped together in the other" may be easily explained, if it should be found that elements which were scattered in one gospel are grouped together in the other on a perceptible principle of order or headings.

Streeter writes as follows:

> How are we to account for this common matter (i.e. the matter common to both Matthew and Luke)? The obvious suggestion that Luke knew Matthew's gospel (or *vice versa*) and derived from it some of his materials breaks down for two reasons.
>
> (1) Sir John Hawkins once showed me a Greek Testament in which he had indicated on the left-hand margin of Mark the exact point in the Markan outline at which Matthew has inserted each of the sayings in question, with, of course, the reference to chapter and verse, to identify it; on the right-hand margin he had similarly indicated the point where Luke inserts matter also found in Matthew. It then appeared that subsequent to the Temptation story, there is not a single case in which Matthew and Luke agree in inserting the same saying at the same point in the Markan outline. If then Luke derived this material from Matthew, he must have gone through both Matthew and Mark so as to discriminate with meticulous precision between Markan and non-Markan material; he must then have proceeded with the utmost care to tear every little piece of non-Markan material he desired to use from the context of Mark in which it appeared in Matthew — in spite of the fact that contexts in Matthew are always exceedingly appropriate — in order to re-insert it into a different context of Mark having no special appropriateness. A theory which would

> make an author capable of such a proceeding would only be tenable if, on other grounds, we had reason to believe he was a crank.
> (2) Sometimes it is Matthew, sometimes it is Luke, who gives a saying in what is clearly the more original form. This is explicable if both are drawing from the same source, each making slight modifications of his own; it is not so if either is dependent on the other. (The Four Gospels, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, p. 183.)

Concerning (1) Streeter assumes that Luke must have been aware that Matthew had used Mark in composing his gospel, selected the non-Markan material in Matthew, and inserted it in fresh places in Mark's gospel. Luke, however, might never have entertained the idea that Matthew used Mark (the supposition has only been made in the last two centuries). It seems, however, possible to suppose that Luke believed that Matthew's gospel lacked order as a historical document and that Mark was too brief a composition to present the gospel in its fullness. In reply to objection (2) it may surely be urged that Luke apart from Mark and Matthew had local sources which stated sayings in a more original form or at least in a form determined by their own *Sitz im Leben*.

In 1915 appeared a small book, How Luke was Written, by E. W. Lummis which seems never to have received the attention it deserves. Lummis pointed out that the discovery that both Matthew and Luke used Mark led to the supposition that they must have used another common source in view of the fact that there is non-Markan matter which is common to both of them. But as he writes, "No hypothetical extrinsic third term should have been called in to help in the solution of the problem (i.e. that non-Markan matter is common to both Matthew and Luke) until it was clear that, without such help, no solution could be reached." (Op. cit., p. vii.) Q still remains, as Lummis then showed, an unknown quantity. No less than sixteen reconstructions of Q are given by Moffatt. (Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament, pp. 197–202.) Streeter gives another reconstruction. (Four Gospels, pp. 283–292.) McNeile admits (Introduction to the New Testament, pp. 82 and 83) that it has been frequently maintained that Luke used Matthew. "No conclusive evidence,"

he proceeds, "however has been adduced; and the chief reason for thinking that the theory is improbable (that Luke used Matthew) is that it is wholly unnecessary." It may be asked what evidence short of a contemporary statement would be conclusive and it may be suggested that the theory is unnecessary as long as a rag-bag Q is postulated from which all agreements between Matthew and Luke have emerged. It seems so often to be forgotten that a gospel was a new literary form without precedent. Yet what are generally accepted as the second and third productions of this new form both contain a birth and infancy narrative, a genealogy, an account of the mission of John Baptist and the temptation. It appears to be more than likely that both gospels follow this pattern because one followed the form of the other rather than that the compilers should independently have devised the same form.

By a minute analysis Lummis arrives at the following conclusions to use his own summary.

> The disposition of the Matthaean matter in Luke is determined by its disposition in Matthew with relation to certain fixed points . . . these points are determined by their Markan parallels, Mk. III. 19; IV. 1; IX. 40; X. 13: and these are determined by the breaks which Luke makes in the Marcan narrative. It follows that the fixed points in Matthew by which Luke regulates his disposition of Matthaean matter are themselves determined by Luke's editorial work on Mark. The inference is inevitable that Luke made use of Mark and Matthew concurrently. He apparently regarded Mark as the better authority for narrative and Matthew as the better for sayings of Jesus . . . . Luke used Mark as the basis of his gospel, paused now and again at a convenient place to gather up the sayings which appeared up to that point in Matthew; and dealt with such a collection of sayings, between point and point, as matter to be separately handled. (Op. cit., p. 38.)

Lummis maintains that the key to Luke's conflation of Mark and Matthew is the word καθεξῆς. As he points out this was no easy task because Matthew's gospel to a large degree is composed of sections which are in no way connected with each other. It is often urged in defense of the customary supposition that Luke's gospel was compiled in ignorance of Matthew's that the beatitudes differ radically as presented in each gospel. Lummis points out that the three ethical blessings which precede the last of the

general beatitudes and the transcript from Psalm 37 at Matthew V. 5 were omitted because they would not conform to Luke's conception that Jesus was blessing his auditors, the chosen disciples. The sayings of Jesus grouped together in Matthew's gospel in what is traditionally called the Sermon on the Mount are in Luke's gospel given a particular context and adapted accordingly on the καθεξῆς principle. Two possible explanations may be given of the difference in the wording of the Lord's Prayer in the two gospels. The prayer was doubtless a basic rite in every Christian community and most likely varied according to the particular traditions in outlook and doctrine. Hence it is not surprising that Matthew with its Judaistic background should use the conception of debt where Luke after the manner of Paul uses that of sin. Alternatively and as it appears to the writer with greater cogency it may be that Luke had Matthew's version before him when giving his own version. As Lummis points out (op. cit., p. 69) quoting several examples Luke shrinks from the thought of the sky as the dwelling-place of God and always alters his source to eliminate it. He omits the clause θέλημα σου . . . . . ἐπὶ γῆς because (1) he refuses to regard heaven as God's home and (2) he never speaks of "the will of God" as that which God *enjoins* or *desires* (namely righteousness) but always as that which God *decrees*. (Op. cit., p. 71.) Luke never uses phrases which allude to ὁ πονηρός and would shrink from writing "rescue us from the devil." τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν is an exegesis upon σήμερον.

Lummis found his hypothesis that the first edition of Luke's gospel was a systematic conflation of Matthew and Mark fortified by a comparison of the Western Text (Codex D) with that of Westcott and Hort. The results he set out as follows:

> Now it is well known that the distinctive readings of D are most striking and important in Luke and Acts. If we examine their bulk in Nestle's *Supplementum*, we see that they are least numerous in John and Matthew, and more abundant in Mark, Luke and Acts. When, again, we distinguish between Luke_{m}[2] and Luke's peculiar matter, we find a remarkable difference in the degree of variation of D from the received text. In the peculiar matter of Luke it is about as low as in Matthew but in Luke_{m} is about as high as in Mark. That is

[2] Luke_{m} = matter taken by Luke from Matthew and Mark.

> to say, D evidently preserves, over and above the ordinary array of variants which it has for Luke as for the other gospels, an extra set of variants specifically for Luke.
> Logic invites us to relate this fact with what is distinctive in $Luke_m$, namely that it once circulated as a separate work. (Op. cit., p. 42.)

To assess the weight of this textual evidence quoted by Lummis in considering the provenance of the Lukan writings it is necessary to recall to mind the picture which textual criticism itself has made in recent years of the early history of the texts of the New Testament.

The most recent and exhaustive study in the field of New Testament textual criticism in English appears to be The Text of the Epistles by Professor Zuntz, which consists of an examination of the Beatty Papyrus 46. In his concluding chapter, he suggests that the history of the New Testament text cannot be traced without taking into account the philological mind and method as a "Greek contribution to the Christian tradition" coming from Alexandria. Referring to the Corpus Paulinum, he believes that the archetype was produced about A.D. 100 at Alexandria. As far as the corpus is concerned its production replaced what other evidence may have existed, but, as copies were distributed among other churches, glosses, expansions and small alterations crept in to suit popular requirements resulting in the wild and "popular text of the second century." All the time, however, a group of Alexandrian Christians, imbued with the Greek respect for the original wording, maintained the purity of the archetype except for such corruptions as are "inseparable" from all tradition by means of written matter. From their legacy eventually emerged the Caesarian ("Euthalia") standard edition. "The popular text, on the other hand, which amidst its corruptions preserved original features lost by its rival, lived on in the Latin versions and the few Greek copies (we only know of bilinguals) current in the West." (P. 280.) If we apply this analysis of the history of the text of the Corpus Paulinum to the Gospels it has to be allowed that the first copies of the Gospels would be produced in the places where they were written. Hence Antioch would have its own copies of Luke, Rome its own copies of Mark, unaffected by Alexandria's authority in philological technique and they would form part of

that second century popular text of which D is a descendant. But Matthew and John, if they were a product of Alexandrine Christianity, would be represented hardly, if at all, in the popular text. It is then not surprising that Brandon's hypothesis that Matthew originated in Alexandria and the suggested connections between St. John's gospel and Alexandria seem to receive impressive confirmation from Lummis' observation that "the distinctive readings of D are least numerous in John and Matthew and more abundant in Mark, Luke and Acts." Furthermore in the matter peculiar to Luke the degree of variations between D and the received text is about as *low as in Matthew, but in* $Luke_m$ *is about as high as in Mark*. From this it may be inferred that $Luke_m$ originated in some Church beyond the philological influence of Alexandria, while the matter peculiar to Luke was inserted not in Alexandria but in a city which shared the philological interests of Alexandria. For this there are three possible candidates, Rome, Ephesus or Caesarea. If the contents of the peculiar matter are taken into account and the nature of the affiliations between Alexandria and these cities are examined the most probable of the three would appear to be Caesarea. Apart from the references to Caesarea in Acts nothing is known of the history of its church until the third century when Origen migrated thither from Alexandria and founded a library there. This would indicate that a close connection had existed for some time previously and it can hardly be supposed that Origen could have made it a seat of learning if the church there had not already possessed an academic and literary tradition.

Acts informs us that Paul was welcomed by the church at Caesarea and later was held there as prisoner for two years. Furthermore Paul is reported on his way to Jerusalem to have stayed at "the house of Philip the Evangelist which was one of the seven. . . . And the same man had four daughters, virgins, which did prophesy." (Acts XXI. 8, 9.)

According to Josephus the Jewish revolt broke out in A.D. 66 because of a dispute between the Jews and Gentiles in Caesarea. So far as can be inferred from Josephus' narrative the city remained throughout the war in the hands of the Romans, who, however, massacred the Jews there in 66 as an act of vengeance for the excesses committed by the Jews elsewhere. The life of the

church at Caesarea continued thus uninterrupted by the confusion and turmoil of 66–70. It is noticeable that the peculiar Lukan matter contains the parables (a) of the good Samaritan (b) of the prodigal son and (c) Dives and Lazarus. They all reflect that universalism which colors the whole of the gospel and which it would be natural to emphasize where Jews had been exterminated and Christians survived under the protection of a Gentile army. The parable of Dives and Lazarus together with the form of the first beatitude as given in Luke emphasizes poverty as a virtue whereas Matthew merely negatively denounces wealth as a moral danger. It is significant that this Ebionite tendency is specially pronounced in Luke's special material and could well reflect the poverty of the Jewish Christians in Palestine after A.D. 70 when the ravages of war had made Palestinian Christians the struggling victims of poverty.

Furthermore it is possible that originally these narratives contained no explicit reference to the virgin-birth but were at a very early stage altered so as to harmonize with the birth-narrative in Matthew which almost everyone is agreed is intended to emphasize Jesus' virginal conception. (Alterations to the Text of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, C. S. C. Williams, p. 25.) As Streeter points out Syr. S. a.b.c. ff^2 read γυναικί instead of μεμνηστευμένῃ in II. 5 and the idea of virginity is only brought out clearly in l. 34. The Old Latin Ms. b omits this verse, substituting for it the first half of verse 38, which is omitted in verse 38. b here is supported by e.

Acts.

It is a commonplace to state that the differences between the text known as D or the Western text and the Alexandrine text as represented by Codex Vaticanus are so wide that they represent different versions or editions of Acts. Blass believed that they were different editions written by the same author. Opinions have varied as to which was the original edition and how two texts so different from each other came into existence. Professor Ropes in the third volume of the Beginnings of Christianity adopted the hypothesis that the Western Text as represented by Codex Bezae D is "not from the hand of the same author as the non-western

text, and that it is a rewritten text, made by a Greek-speaking Christian who knew something of Hebrew in the East, perhaps in Syria or Palestine." Professor Clark (Acts of the Apostles, 1933) defended the priority of the Western Text by maintaining that whole lines preserved by the Western Text had dropped out from the other text. His thesis, however, has met with little favor, chiefly because it has been felt that methods which were applicable to classical texts cannot be applied to the texts of sacred books and that it demands an excessive credulity in the infallibility of numerical calculations. Here it is proposed (1) to apply to the text of Acts the same kind of analysis which Lummis applied to the text of Luke and appeared to support his hypothesis that there were two editions of the gospel (a) a conflation of Mark and Matthew and (b) a second edition consisting of the original edition with new matter from another source and (2) to suggest that the original of Acts was written at Antioch containing the greater part of Codex Bezae and setting forth the history of the early church from the point of view of a Pauline Christian, while a later edition was produced at Caesarea which contained new interpolations slightly modifying the story of the birth of Christianity and completely rewritten to keep the book within the limits of convenient size and in the terminology of the Jewish Christian churches such as Caesarea and Alexandria.

Before an analysis and comparison of the texts is made the arguments of Ropes in defense of the priority of the Alexandrine text deserve examination. To maintain the priority of the Alexandrine text he has to suggest why the text was revised in the form of the Western Text. He therefore writes (op. cit., pp. ccxxxi and ccxxxii) "The purpose of the 'Western reviser' was literary improvement and elaboration in accordance with his own taste, which was somewhat different from that of the author. He aimed at bettering the connection, removing superficial inconsistency, filling slight gaps, and giving a more complete and continuous narrative . . . . Especially congenial to his style were heightened emphasis and more abundant use of religious commonplaces. This effort after smoothness, fulness and emphasis in his expansion has usually resulted in a weaker style, sometimes showing a sort of naïve superabundance in expressly stating what every reader could have understood

without the reviser's diluting supplement." It will be noticed that he omits to give any examples of the points which he makes. What he really appears to mean is that the reviser aimed at "a literary improvement and elaboration according to his own taste" which he failed to accomplish, as we are told that "he makes more abundant use of religious commonplaces and that this effort . . . resulted in a weaker style."

If, however, the reverse of Ropes' theory is assumed the differences noted by Ropes seem to receive a more adequate explanation. If it be assumed that the original text of Acts was that of Codex D, except for certain passages which will be indicated at a later stage, written by a Pauline Christian at Antioch and the Alexandrian text is a revision of D made in Caesarea, we should expect to find the original version with a heightened emphasis and more abundant use of religious commonplaces "sometimes showing a sort of naïve superabundance, etc." In other words, the style has freshness but lacks polish which is just what might be expected. On the other hand, it seems not improbable that Caesarea much resembled Alexandria as a cultural center with a mixed population of Jews and Greeks: it cannot be supposed that Origen would have gone thither from Alexandria unless he had known that he would find there a cultural tradition favorable to theological study and the foundation of a *scriptorium*. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that someone in Caesarea with a sense of literary style condensed the Western Text by reducing the pleonasms and giving it an added "dignity, force and charm." (Op. cit., p. ccxxxxii.) To take an example the reader is asked to compare the versions of Acts XVI. vv. 35–37. It is hard to estimate why anyone should lengthen the opening sentence ἡμέρας δὲ etc. as given in B. But it is easily seen to be a neat précis of the longer form given in D. ὁὺς ἐχθὲς παρέλαβες is unnecessary and therefore can be omitted but conversely there is no reason why it should have been added. καὶ ἐσέλθων is unnecessary but why should it have been added? On the other hand ἐν ἐιρήνῃ gives a purpose to the instruction. The authorities wished them to go *in peace* so that nothing would be heard of "the incident." ἀναιτείους is superfluous and implied in ἀκατακρίτους.

Lummis found his hypothesis concerning the composition of

Luke's gospel supported in singular manner by comparing the degrees of variation between the Western Text and the B type of text. It will be remembered that he found that the degree was distinctly lower for those sections of the gospel containing matter peculiar to it than the other sections containing matter to be found in Matthew and Mark. To apply the same calculus to the text of Acts is not so easy because there is no agreement as to what were the sources used in the composition of Acts or how they were used. Almost everyone agrees that Acts is a compilation. If it is true that the Jewish Christian gospel was distinctive from the Pauline gospel, this distinction should enable us to recognize the various patches which make up Acts. Unfortunately for this purpose at any rate the compiler appears to have attempted to smooth over the differences in doctrine which his sources displayed, because he wished to gloss over them. We can, however, begin by assuming that the second half of Acts beginning at Acts X, v. 36 is a single composition by itself. The ratio of variants between the B text and D text to the amount of matter in this portion of Acts is approximately .7, i.e. for every ten lines there are seven variants. Where the degree of variation falls considerably below this ratio in the first part of Acts, it may be assumed that the scribe who made the archetype of D, as we have it, had before him a codex of B and a codex of D which lacked those sections showing the lower ratio. The degree of variation comes out as follows:

I. 1–14	.5	Addition 1.
I. 15–26	.4	Addition 2.
II. 1–47	.7	
III. 1–V. 16	.7	
V. 17–42	.5	Addition 3.
VI. 1–VIII. 29	.5	Addition 4. (a).
X. 15–XI. 3	.7	
XI. 4–18	.4	Addition 4. (b).
XI. 19–30	.7	
XIII. 1–XIII. 3	.4	Addition 5.
XIII. 4–52	.7	
XIV.	.7	
XV. 1–35	.5	Addition 6.

Thus it may be considered that the passages betraying a lower

ratio of variants were added to an earlier version of Acts represented by the rest of Acts as it is given in D. The different readings in these portions of Acts and the nature of their contents support the probability that they were additions to a first edition.

Addition 1.

Acts I. 1–14. D contains two notable additions in this passage. (1) v. 3 καὶ ἐκέλευσε κηρύσσειν τὸ ἐναγγέλιον which may be a gloss added by the compiler or on the other hand may have been omitted as superfluous by a later literary editor in Alexandria. (2) v. 6 ἕως τῆς πεντεκοστῆς. This may indicate that there were two versions of Acts, one containing the story of Pentecost and the other omitting it. It has been suggested that Acts II. 1–40 is a double of Acts IV. 31.

Addition 2.

I. 15–26 contains the story of the election of Matthias to take the place in the college of the twelve vacant by the perfidy and suicide of Judas. Although the appointment of the twelve is traced to Jesus himself, who seems to have associated it with the apocalyptic imagery of twelve partaking of the Messianic banquet and judging the twelve tribes of Israel, the college of the twelve apostles at Jerusalem seems to have given way to the rule of James, the brother of the Lord, as early as A.D. 44. The Manual of Discipline informs us that the Judaean covenant community at Qumran was ruled by an inner group of twelve laymen and three priests (I.Q.S. viii. 1). Commenting on this Johnson (The Jerusalem Church in Acts. An Essay in The Scrolls and the New Testament, edited by Stendahl, S.C.M. Press, pp. 133, 134) writes as follows:

> The motivation of the Matthaean story has never been quite clear. Certainly there is no evidence that a college of twelve was for any length of time a feature of church organisation. The passage in Acts suggests only that a twelfth man was needed as a witness (perhaps an official witness v. 22) of the resurrection. But this is simply the general view of Luke-Acts, namely that the Christian mission is a witness of Jesus' deeds and teaching and his resurrection. A more likely supposition is that the twelve are the community's council for

the coming messianic age when they will sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes as lies behind the institution of a council of twelve in I.Q.S. viii. After all they rule over a community of apocalyptic expectation.

Acts XIX informs us that there were in Ephesus twelve disciples who had been baptized in John's baptism, had never heard of the Holy Spirit, and, if, as seems probable, were associated with Apollos, they must have come from Alexandria. We know nothing of the foundation of the church at Alexandria or its church-order. If the opinion of Streeter and Vernon Bartlett is assumed to be correct, that Deutero-Clement originated in Alexandria, then it can be said that about A.D. 150 the church there was governed by a board of presbyters. When mono-episcopacy came into existence there until at any rate the third century the Bishop was elected *by the twelve presbyters* of the city churches and "was then consecrated to his office." When the see was vacant, the twelve presbyters chose one of themselves, and the remaining eleven laying their hands on his head, blessed him, and created him patriarch. (Streeter, The Primitive Church, pp. 253, 254.) It would seem therefore as if churches such as those at Alexandria and Ephesus and originally at Jerusalem which were founded by Jewish Christians were governed by a college of twelve. The church at Rome seems to have been originally governed by a college of presbyters although there is no evidence that they were twelve in number. (See Streeter, op. cit., pp. 213–218.) This passage of Acts may very well then have been inserted at a church of Jewish Christian color such as Caesarea to explain how the original apostolic college at Jerusalem maintained its complement of twelve. It is interesting to note that in II. 14 where B has *σὺν τοῖς ἕνδεκα* D has *σὺν τοῖς δέκα ἀποστόλοις*. This supports the contention that D provides evidence for an earlier version of Acts to which I. 14–26 originating in some Jewish Christian church was added later.

Addition 3.

V. 17–42. Apart from the low degree of variants there is little else to indicate that this passage was interpolated into an earlier edition of Acts. Harnack picked it out as derived from what he called the Jerusalem B source. From the references to Theudas

and Judas in the speech of Gamaliel it has been inferred that the writer had access if not to the works of Josephus at any rate to the source used by Josephus. (The Acts of the Apostles, C. S. C. Williams, p. 20.) This at any rate would indicate that the passage was written in a literary center where such a source was available. Probably the story originated from the church in Jerusalem after 44 when it came under the control of James and his party who were closely allied with the Pharisees. The whole passage closely resembles IV. 1 ff., cf. Moffatt, Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament, 2nd ed., p. 291, "The presence of dual sources is even suggested by the parallelism of IV. 1, f. and V. 17–42."

Addition 4. (a). VI. 1–VIII. 29.

VI. 1–VIII. 3 contains the story of Stephen's trial and martyrdom. It may be noticed that it forms an isolated incident in the history of the church and in no way influenced the evolution of the constitution or doctrine of the early church. Although Stephen is reported to have been one of the original deacons he is never said to have discharged the functions for which they were ordained but to have remained an evangelist. His defense consists of an attack on the temple-cult and a denunciation of the Jews for failing to obey the call of the prophets to proclaim universalism. So eccentric appears the Christianity of Stephen to be that Schoeps has called him an *Ersatz-Figur* masking James, the bishop of Jerusalem. It may be that the compiler of Acts received the story of Stephen from Jerusalem perhaps via Alexandria at Caesarea without understanding its real significance.

There is a gap in Codex Bezae from VIII. 29 to X. 15. As Goguel pointed out VIII. 4 is a doublet of XI. 19 which would suggest that the matter between these points is an insertion. If so, the first insertion would appear to consist of the stories of Paul's conversion and Cornelius' conversion and acceptance by Peter. They were doubtless placed beside each other to balance one another, as the story of Cornelius' conversion is really that of Peter's to universalism. A later insertion, probably made at Caesarea, would be VIII. 4–40 containing the account of Philip's missionary campaign in Samaria and XI. 4–18 containing Peter's account to the church

in Jerusalem of the conversion of Cornelius and his household. First of all it is noticeable that the latter of itself adds nothing to the narrative except that we are told that the church in Jerusalem approved of Peter's action. There was no need to recount in detail what Peter said in Jerusalem and repeat the story of Cornelius' conversion. Williams (op. cit., p. 140) calls the repetition, "Luke's rather clumsy Semitic way of stressing the event." Probably, however, we have here an interpolation which amounts to another version of the same incident taken from a different source. It may be part of an independent record of a conference at Jerusalem concerning the admission of Gentiles into the church and is inserted because it shows Peter subordinate to the church in Jerusalem and also serves one of the purposes of Acts at any rate in its final form, expressing the unity of the primitive church and the acceptance of universalism even by the church in Jerusalem. The hypothesis that Acts XI. 3–18 is a late interpolation seems to be supported by the variant reading of D in verses 1–3.

D provides an appropriate ending to the story of Cornelius. XI. 19 beginning a new narrative follows on without any perceptible hiatus while B appears to be D rewritten to serve as an introduction to XI. 3–18. It will also be noticed that B is much better Greek than D.

Addition 5.

XII. 1–XIII. 3. This contains an account of Herod's persecution of the church in Jerusalem, Peter's arrest and escape and Herod's subsequent death. This narrative could well have come from Jerusalem, perhaps via Alexandria.

Addition 6.

Acts XV. 3–35. This passage narrates the story of the council at Jerusalem about which there has been so much controversy concerning its relationship to the account of Paul's visits to Jerusalem in Galatians II. 1–12. Kirsopp Lake reconciled the two accounts by making the account of the incident at Antioch and Paul's subsequent visit to Jerusalem basically correct because it is the record of a participant and by distinguishing two sources for the account in Acts as follows (Beginnings of Christianity, Vol. V, p. 203):

	Galatians.	Antioch Source.	Jerusalem Source.
1. Paul's visit to Jerusalem.	II. 1–2	Acts XI. 27–30	.....
2. The "Council" of the Apostles.	II. 3–10	.....	Acts XV. 3–29
3. Paul's return to Antioch.	implied by II. 11	Acts XII. 25	Acts XV. 30
4. Peter's arrival in Antioch.	II. 11	.....	.....
5. The arrival of emissaries from James.	II. 12	Acts XV. 1–2	.....
6. A quarrel of Paul against Peter and Barnabas	II. 13–14	Acts XV. 36 ff.	.....

This distinction would be supported by our analysis of the degrees of variation. But it would also support Professor Goguel's contention stated as follows, "The story in Acts XV combines two traditions, one referring to the conference of 43–44, the other to a decision which the church at Jerusalem made at a much later date to fix a minimum of ritual observance for Gentile converts to agree to keep in order that Christians of Jewish origin might be able to enter into relations with them. When the two traditions were fused that concerning the conference at Jerusalem was bound to have been altered." (The Birth of Christianity, Goguel, Eng. Trans., p. 300.)

It may well be that the compiler of Acts as we have it came from Antioch where of course he had learned of the series of events as recounted in Galatians. At Caesarea he came across an account of a dispute between Peter and the church at Jerusalem concerning intercourse between Jewish and Gentile Christians, a subsequent council at Jerusalem and the issue of a decree. XV. 12 seems to be a doublet of XV. 4. If the latter is omitted it would appear that Paul and Barnabas are not mentioned in this account of the council. The compiler, however, to fuse the two traditions describes (XV. v. 1. 22.26) the despatch of Paul and Barnabas to Antioch. That this account did not originally refer to a council attended by Paul is supported by the fact that when Paul came to Jerusalem

for the last time James tells him of the decisions taken at the council at Jerusalem as though Paul had not heard of them before (XXI. 25).

We have three distinct readings concerning the terms of the decree of the council. For XV. 20 B reads *ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐιδωλοθύτων καὶ ἁίματος καὶ πνικτῶν*
P. 46, *ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐιδωλοθύτων καὶ ἁίματος καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ*
1). *ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐιδωλοθύτων καὶ ἁίματος καὶ πορνείας καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλετε ἑκυτοῖς γείνεσθαι ἑτέρῳ μὴ ποιεῖν.*

The arguments in favor of the various readings are clearly stated by C. S. C. Williams (Alterations to the Text of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, pp. 73, 74). The objections that the reading of D implies that murder, idolatry and fornication were such common practices among Asiatic Christians that they had to be expressly prohibited and that it is less probable that a ceremonial-food law should be substituted for a moral prohibition than the reverse seem decisively to rule out D as the original reading. Because, however, ritual prohibitions by the time the archetype of D was made had ceased to have any significance these moral prohibitions with the negative form of the golden rule were substituted. Does, however, P. 46 represent the original reading from which both Western and Alexandrine texts have diverged? The answer depends on whether P. 46 represents a "Caesarean" text. As Williams points out 1739 which is connected with Origen and Caesarea in a remarkable degree does not support this reading. However, it has to be remembered that 1739 is a tenth century codex, that its scribe Ephraim *may* have had access to a critical edition made at Caesarea. Such was the authority of Alexandria in the field of textual criticism that it may well have been thought that on such an important reading as this Alexandria possessed the correct version.

The variants here, I would suggest, illustrate the history of the compilation of Acts and the early history of the text. Possibly Luke himself compiled the first draft of Acts in Antioch using various sources consisting of his own travel diary and information picked up in Rome, Corinth, Ephesus and, not least, Antioch itself, whence he probably derived some of his information concerning the church in Jerusalem. This we have represented in the

Western Text with the exception of those portions which I believe the low degree of variation between B and D disclose to be interpolations. The "Western" addition in XI. 27 and 28 in the first person provides supporting evidence. It is noticeable that many of the distinguishing features and tendencies of the Western Text are characteristically Pauline and reflect the theological and devotional color of Asiatic Christianity as it has been brought out by Brandon and Goguel. Ropes (B.C., Vol. III, ccxxxiii) notices passages where in D the hostile attitude of the Jews receives special stress (XIV. 5, XXIV. 5 and also II. 17, possibly II. 47). He also points out passages (XX. 21 and XVI. 15) where the variants in D suggest that the "sebomenoi" won by the Apostles were converted from the status of heathen to the true God through Christ, not merely from Jewish faith to Christianity. Lagrange (Critique textuelle, 390 ff.) and W. L. Knox (St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem, 1925, p. xviii) point out that in nine passages D has the title Christos as well as kyrios Jesus, in three passages kyrios is given as well as Jesus Christ and in two passages kyrios is added to Jesus. Both the title Christos and kyrios are peculiarly Pauline. Lagrange also points out that the work of the Holy Spirit is emphasized (VI. 10, VIII. 18, XI. 17, XV. 29, 32, XIX. 1).

Pneumatism was a peculiar feature of Asiatic Christianity: it will be remembered that the Christians from Alexandria had never heard of the Holy Spirit. Lagrange also notes that (1) the influence of the Christian preaching and of the Christian faith is specially noted in the Western Text (he cites 21 instances) and (2) the Western Text underlines the hostility of the Jews towards Christianity of which ten instances are given. Christian evangelism was much more aggressive in the Churches of Asia Minor than in Jerusalem and Alexandria while universalism was a distinctive feature of Pauline Christianity.

I would suggest that this first draft was brought to Caesarea accompanied perhaps at the same time also by the first edition of Luke's gospel as delineated by Lummis. Caesarea would be a church with contacts both with Jerusalem and Alexandria. Christians from Samaria, Galilee, and Jerusalem would be drawn thither by the unsettlement caused by the Jewish war, bringing with them lore concerning the birth of Jesus, his contacts with Samaria as

well as Galilee, traditions concerning Christian beginnings at Jerusalem of which no one who had been in Jerusalem merely as a companion of Paul was likely to have heard. Caesarea and Alexandria, compared with Antioch and other Asiatic churches, were founded by Jews and as the Cornelius incident shows were compelled by forces beyond their control to admit Gentile converts in their fold. The Asiatic churches on the other hand were founded by men of Gentile origin, although perhaps they had been proselytes before they were Christian. Their problem of fellowship was created by Jewish Christians from other churches. Under the leadership of Paul they did not ask for a directive but for the approval of their universalism. Caesarea and Alexandria, probably under the leadership of Peter, asked for directions from Jerusalem and obtained the ritual prohibitions set forth in the decree mentioned in chapter XV of Acts. Its promulgation may not have been so formal as Acts would have us believe and may have varied to the extent that πορνεία (marriage within prohibited degrees) was not specifically prohibited in Alexandria. A new compilation of Acts is made at Caesarea about A.D. 85 incorporating these passages which we have examined. It would not seem unreasonable to assume that in Alexandria, if not in Caesarea, the book of Acts in its new and extended form would be judged too bulky for convenience and also deficient in style. Hence it came to be very largely rewritten, less vivid, but more precise in style, in the theological idiom peculiar to Jewish Christianity, with contradictions eliminated and the connections between the matter of the first edition and the interpolations smoothed over (cf. especially XI. 1–3). "D is longer than B by about 8½%," states Sir F. Kenyon (The Western Text in the Gospels and Acts, p. 26). Professor Zuntz, in his Schweich lectures on the text of the Corpus Paulinum suggests that the two facts (1) the existence of two main branches of the text of the New Testament, the Eastern and the Western, and (2) the emergence of the "Alexandrian" text, a text purer than its predecessor, are to be explained by the intrusion in the first half of the second century of a philological interest from Alexandria where, as Zuntz says, "Philology was in the air" (p. 272). D is representative of the wild popular text which was current in the second century over against which the Eastern tradi-

tion represented by codices Sinaiticus and B came to be accepted as the pure text. To quote Zuntz (p. 271), "Whether or no codices Sinaiticus and B were written at Caesarea, they represent the Alexandrian tradition — of which Caesarea is an offshoot — Alexandria at least in the sense that the attitude and technique to which they witness derive from that Greek philology of which Alexandria was the centre." It can be assumed as probable that copies of Acts as represented by B would also find their way into Asia Minor. But the ritual prohibitions would have no, or little, significance for Asiatic Christians. They were therefore interpreted in ethical terms and the golden rule in a negative form was added. Sometime perhaps in the fourth century a scribe had before him two manuscripts: (1) an isolated copy of the original draft of Acts which had survived the early predominance of the text of Alexandria and (2) a copy of the later Alexandrian edition with the additions which we have suggested were made at Caesarea. Using (1) as his base, he copies from (2) the interpolated passages in their appropriate place. Such would be the archetype of the text known as D.

This reconstruction which the scantiness of the evidence of necessity renders largely hypothetical does not preclude the probability that the edition of Acts represented in D is not itself a compilation. Both the doublet Acts VIII. 4 and XI. 19, and the statement in the first person plural in XI. 27 and 28, would suggest this. But the latter supports our general hypothesis as well as the earliest statement concerning the authorship of Acts as given in the anti-marcionite prologue (A. H. McNeile, op. cit., p. 29), which is in no way based on statements in the New Testament, and asserts that both Matthew and Mark were written before Luke wrote his gospel and that Luke was a Syrian of Antioch who composed his gospel and Acts in Achea so that "the faithful ex-Gentiles should not be distracted by Jewish myths" and died in Boeotia.

If these statements have the slightest kernel of fact, they at the very least imply that the Lukan writings originated in Asiatic churches, while the philological interests of Alexandria assured to its versions of these "Western" compositions an overmastering authority.

SOME NOTES ON THE THEOLOGY OF NOMINALISM
With Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance

HEIKO A. OBERMAN
Harvard Divinity School

To understand the essence of an historical movement, be it primarily philosophical, theological or cultural, the inquirer should abstain from generalizations and obediently analyze the relevant sources.

To understand its significance, however, he has, consciously or unconsciously, to take the dangerous step of comparing movement with movement in order to find a frame of reference which can bring out, by antithesis or analogy, the typical characteristics.

This latter method has been applied to the study of the Renaissance in two ways. On the one hand, it has been compared with medieval scholasticism mainly in its thirteenth-century Aristotelian form.[1] On the other hand, the Renaissance has been compared with the Reformation, although no *one* opinion prevails at the moment. The present paper will seek to indicate the relation of the early Renaissance and late medieval Nominalism within the larger context offered by the question "what are the characteristics of Nominalism" and in this way suggest a new appraisal of the motives behind this movement.

Successively, we shall try to define in a first section the Nominalistic attitude; in the second, to survey the different schools within this movement; and, in the third, to outline its basic principles. In the concluding chapter we shall offer some remarks on

[1] Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, London, 1954[3], pp. 667–680. Esp. p. 677, note 2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, New York, 1941–1943, I, pp. 59–61. For the opposite view see Roy W. Battenhouse, "The Doctrine of Man in Calvin and in Renaissance Platonism," Journal of the History of Ideas, IX, No. 4 (October, 1948), pp. 447–471. "Has Calvin, in part, simply projected the outlook of humanism to a higher level? . . . In the points I have considered I see more signs of polarity than of radical disagreement" (pp. 470–471). Charles Trinkaus, "The Problem of Free Will in the Renaissance and Reformation," Journal of the History of Ideas, X, No. 7 (January, 1949), pp. 51–62. "It is the limited nature of the moral freedom taught in the Renaissance that seems to have been overlooked. . . . And it is at this point that the relationship with Reformation thought can be established."

the concept of man and his freedom in the early Italian Renaissance and the relation of two movements which were decisive factors in the change of the spiritual climate of Europe at the end of the Middle Ages.

Not only because of our indebtedness to many who dedicated themselves to trends in late medieval thought, but also because of the immature stage in which the research in this field is — and will be for some time — we must be in a continual dialogue with scholars both of the past and of the present.

I. Nominalism

Compared with the exploration of High-Scholasticism, Reformation and Renaissance, the inquiry into the essence and significance of Nominalism is sketchily charted territory.

The term itself reveals that originally it was meant to circumscribe a philosophical movement which accepted a divergence of the logical and the ontological order of things, in some respects parallel to that of early scholasticism represented by Abelard and Roscellin. The Nominalistic theory of knowledge, especially, has led historians of philosophy to believe that here we are dealing with the heart of this late medieval movement. One of the most learned experts in this field, Paul Vignaux, has concluded that the distinction between the *notitia intuitiva* and the *notitia abstractiva* "semble le point de départ de la théorie de la connaissance, peut-être de toute la philosophie de Guillaume d'Ockham."[2]

Except for this theory of knowledge which is common to both, there are marked differences between Nominalism and Occamism. In Occamism one finds this epistemology with the doctrine of the non-physical relation, the doctrine of local or temporal exterior mutation, and an actualistic psychology which results in the rejection of the *habitus*.

As Occamism is the most mature, developed and extreme form of Nominalism, these names are often used interchangeably; but, from the point of view of the history of ideas, it is more correct to distinguish between them.

Two discernible developments have brought the whole question

[2] P. Vignaux, Nominalisme au XIV^e^ Siècle, Montreal, Paris, 1948, p. 11.

of the characteristics of late medieval Nominalism to the fore again. By publishing Occam's works the Franciscan Institute made it possible to question the departure of Occam from the high-scholastic tradition, especially the Franciscan school. In an article entitled "Ist Ockhams Relationstheorie Nominalismus?"[3] Gottfried Martin came to the following conclusion: "Die Relationstheorie Ockhams kann nicht als Nominalismus bezeichnet werden, ohne dass gewisse Teile der Relationstheorie des Aquinaten ebenfalls als Nominalismus bezeichnet werden. Ockham steht hier in einem unauflöslichen Zusammenhang mit Aristoteles, Thomas und Duns Scotus."

This first new approach is inspired by the wish to show Occam's orthodoxy; for whether one deals with Occam's political, philosophical or theological ideas, the recurring motif is that Occam is far more in line with tradition than had been thought before. Erich Hochstetter and Philotheus Böhner, O.F.M., proved convincingly that Occam does not mark a sudden break with many aspects of thirteenth-century thought — so convincingly, in fact, that we must take care to avoid the other extreme: the blurring of the deep contrasts between Occamistic and pre-Occamistic thought.

A second development deals with a new understanding of the primary frame of reference and of the message of late medieval Nominalism. Originally, the historians of philosophy had defined the school of Occam according to the aforementioned philosophical and logical characteristics. Theologians and church historians, starting much later to pay due attention to this too-long neglected period, discovered many non-philosophical and non-logical elements which are now beginning to be recognized as co-constituting the inner core of Nominalism.

What we want to do is to go a step further by showing that the theological concept of God is not merely one of many aspects of the inner core of Nominalism, but that its concept of God and Revelation is at the heart of this movement, while logic is its expression in philosophical language[4] — howbeit a very important and revealing expression.

[3] G. Martin, op. cit. in Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950), pp. 31–49; p. 49.

[4] In his "Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as illustrated by Pierre

Cardinal Ehrle in his important book on Peter of Candia was the first to see the danger of a one-sided philosophical treatment of Occam and his school.[5]

The present confusion about the meaning of the adjective "Nominalistic" can be reduced to the dilemma of whether to define its value in philosophical terms — an idea too well supported by the sources to be abolished — or to define its value in a more theological way. It appears more and more that certain conceptions common to the group traditionally called "Nominalists" can be found as well with Thomists and Scotists and even seem to be characteristic of the whole climate of thought in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

I should like to suggest that Nominalistic theology is not merely an automatic conclusion drawn out of its philosophy; but, on the contrary, Nominalistic philosophy is the reflection and echo of its theology and, in particular, of its concept of God's *potentia absoluta*. In turn, the preponderance of its logic shows itself again and again in the way this basic concept is applied and handled.

Duns Scotus had already emphasized the weakness of the human power of reason if confronted with the mysteries of faith. Bonaventure, Duns and, later, Occam had only too clearly in mind the errors of the pagan philosophers who had tried to give answers without the illumination by faith.

Duns' solution breaks away from Thomas' subalternation of man's theological thinking to revelation and its categories of knowledge, but at the same time it defends the possibility of a real science with God as object, *sub propria ratione deitatis*. Scotus' idea of the formal distinction apparently had its origin in the problem of man's knowledge of God.

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d'Ailly on Predestination and Justification," Harvard Theological Review 52, 1 (January, 1959), pp. 43–60, George Lindbeck qualifies the theological differences within Nominalism first as "secondary" (p. 51) and later even as the "by-product of an intellectual approach. . ." (p. 60). As far as Occam's stress of the philosophically important *notitia intuitiva* is concerned, it is quite significant that this concept has the stamp of Augustinian epistemological mysticism.

[5] Cardinal Ehrle, "Der Sentenzencommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexander V," Franziskanische Studien, Münster, Beiheft IX (1925), p. 106: "Zur Kennzeichnung derselben (i.e. the Nominalistic school) dürfen wir uns nicht mit einem Hinweis auf die logische Eigenart dieser Schule begnügen. Ohne Zweifel ist diese Bezeichnung 'Nominalismus' einseitig von dieser logischen Eigenart genommen."

Though Occam's thought, from the Prologus of the Sentences and on, is directed against the Scotistic *distinctio formalis* it is not Duns' point of departure that he criticizes, but the fact that this point had not been consequently carried through. The omnipotence of God, properly understood, makes deductive theology impossible; the absolute power of God undercuts any rules theologians want to draw up on the basis of God's historical acts. God chose this way of revealing himself; he could have chosen innumerable other ways, equally reasonable, and this conception clearly amounts to a refutation of ontologism. Robert Guelluy puts it very sharply: "Ockham présente lui-même sa doctrine comme une réfutation de l'ontologisme par la théorie aristotélicienne de la connaissance et comme une rectification des vues du Stagirite par le dogme de la liberté divine." [6]

It cannot be our task to concentrate on the means with which Occam and his school worked to prove their point, but we can analyze the motives behind this endeavor. We do not look into the structure of his logic, but into that of his theology, for the real character of Nominalism; and, again, it is within the theological structure that the dialectics of God's *potentia absoluta* is the ruling principle.

Before attempting to trace the ramifications of this principle we will first outline the different schools within the Nominalistic movement in order to understand more clearly that we are dealing with a whole complex of cross trends and opinions.

II. Schools

The absence of a common opinion on what marks Nominalism as a separate movement makes it appear bold to try to outline its different "schools," as I shall call its various threads of tradition. Besides, so many fourteenth- and fifteenth-century authors are so slightly known and manuscripts — often anonymous — are so widely scattered that it is premature to attempt to settle this problem once and for all.

[6] R. Guelluy, Philosophie et Théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham, Louvain, Paris, 1947, p. 372. Cf. E. Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham, ihre Bedeutung für die Ursachen der Reformation, Wiesbaden, 1956, p. 3.

On the other hand, by arbitrarily choosing Peter Aureolus, William of Occam, or Gabriel Biel as *the* representative of Nominalism we have long been led astray as regards the implications of its idea of the omnipotence of God. If we try to see these three men in a greater whole, their individual peculiarities might be neutralized and the common framework extricated more clearly.

We do not mean to be exhaustive in any sense; a mere structure — a working hypothesis, meant to be criticized and enlarged by the ongoing findings and analyses of newly-discovered manuscripts — will suffice.

Rather recently a new means of classification has been advocated by Father Damasus Trapp, O.E.S.A. In a rich and extensive article which will prove to be extremely helpful for research concerned with late medieval thought, he expresses his desire "to contribute a few notes on fourteenth-century Augustinian theology." Although this school constitutes, of course, only one section of Nominalism, it is with Gregory of Rimini, for instance, a vital one.

Father Trapp wants to characterize the thirteenth century as the great century of speculation, and the fourteenth as the great century of criticism, a criticism moving along two lines — the historico-critical and logico-critical. To delineate this latter movement he does not go back to the theological background of Nominalism and its positive message, but to the historical event of the clash between Thomists and Scotists and the climate of criticism which resulted from this. It is too early to pass final judgment on these suggestions; but, even though it might be possible to make a real distinction between the historico- and logico-critical attitudes, this will not lead us to a better grasp of the essence of Nominalism. Perhaps he despairs of finding categories that fit the different trends. The questionableness of this classification is revealed by Father Trapp himself when he says: "Some evince a pronounced lack of historical-mindedness; others insist on it. All to a greater or lesser degree show signs and symptoms of the logico-critical attitude."[7]

It is difficult to find traces of a *new* historical consciousness.

[7] Fr. D. Trapp, O.E.S.A., "Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century," Augustana VI (1956), p. 150.

On the contrary, in circles of the most extreme logicism we encounter an a-historical trend which tends to lower authorities to *opiniones*.

Although William of Occam bears the title Venerabilis Inceptor, it can be shown that Peter Aureolus († 1322) and Durandus de Sancto Portiano († 1334) anticipated some of his ideas. It is Aureolus, especially, who is often quoted by many Nominalists in connection with the famous XVIIth distinction of the First Book of Lombard's Sentences where he dealt with the relation of created and uncreated love. Aureolus is criticized almost without exception for adhering to the necessity of the grace-*habitus*; but for the rest he exhibits all the features one might expect within a beginning movement which must always be justifying its own existence. In this case it had to criticize its predecessors on the grounds of a supposed lack of understanding of God's omnipotence. Therefore, we find in him sharp criticism of the most recent tradition and the denial of any ontological distinction between universal and particular things.

Dr. Anneliese Maier was the first to show the great measure of Peter Aureolus' dependence on the Dominican rebel Durandus through the Quodlibet of Thomas of Wilton.[8] His works show the traces of the stormy days in which he grew up, days of conflict between Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair. He is less important for the history of Nominalism than Aureolus, not only because he is quoted less often, but because he is not as much of a Nominalistic theologian as has been supposed. But his conflict with the theology (hence, the order) of Thomas, primarily on the point of the divine *concursus*, ushered in a period of new critical, and often very independent, investigation.

The thought of Aureolus and Durandus indicates that something was simmering in university circles on the Continent. The movement received impetus by the form it assumed on the other side of the Channel; though the ground was prepared for him, William of Occam is, indeed, the "Inceptor" of the late-medieval Nominalistic Movement.

In our search for the essence of Nominalism and its concept of man we must not, however, limit ourselves to Occam, but rather

[8] Gregorianum, 29 (1948), pp. 212–223.

put our questions to the truest representatives of this whole movement. I venture to suggest that we should discern four schools in Nominalism.

The first, the English school, mainly represented by Robert Holcot († 1349) and Adam Woodham († 1358), is best defined as the left-wing school of Nominalism. As clearly as the other schools, and as Occam himself, it shows the centrality of the idea of God's omnipotence — applying it, however, in a most extreme way. Its logic leads to scepticism; its theology to the remarkable combination of determinism and Pelagianism. The moral freedom of man is stressed; but, at the same time, God's government appears to be so immediate that He has to take more than customary responsibility for man's sinful deeds.

An echo of the English school can be heard in Nicolas de Autrecourt and Jean de Mirecourt. Here we find exactly the same combination of scepticism, determinism, and — in a lesser degree — Pelagianism. A direct line between Woodham and Holcot on the one hand and Autrecourt and Mirecourt on the other has been indicated elsewhere.[9] The Church's condemnation of the two Parisians in 1346 and 1347 is responsible for the fact that their influence is negligible.

In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the second school finds its representatives mainly at the University of Paris. We should like to call this the Parisian syncretistic school. Here the influence of Scotus and Occam is merged in such a way as to make it very difficult to decide what the first loyalty of its representatives is. John of Ripa (c. 1355) and Peter of Candia († 1410) can be mentioned in this connection. John Gerson who repeatedly expressed his impatience with this particular tradition should not be assigned to this school.[10]

The innumerable unpublished *Questiones* and reported *Disputationes* reveal a sphere of rivalry of sterile cleverness. Gerson's seven points of critique of this Parisian school revolve around the

[9] H. A. Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, A Fourteenth-Century Augustinian. A Study of His Theology in its Historical Context, Kemink, Utrecht, 1958, pp. 205 ff.

[10] "Il y a donc Nominalisme et Nominalisme; mais il n'y a pas à hésiter sur la position de Gerson; c'est un Nominalisme." A. Combes, Jean Gerson, Commentateur Dionysien, Paris, 1940, p. 611.

accusation that because of idle curiosity the rapport between faith and theology is endangered. On this school, especially, much research has still to be done; but the evidence that is available seems to bear out Gerson's criticisms.

The third school can best be called the right-wing, and it is represented by Gregory of Rimini († 1358) and Henry of Oyta († 1394). Thomas Bradwardine († 1349) shares most of its characteristics, though for a long time — actually since the fourteenth century itself — he was mistakenly grouped together with Ripa and Mirecourt.[11] This school takes an Augustinian stand, in contrast to the Pelagian trends which we observed in the English left-wing. It tries, as much as do the other schools, to bring out the autonomy of man as regards the natural world, and to prove the compatibility of the freedom of the will with God's sovereignty.

The theology of the fourth school is a typical "Vermittlungstheologie." John Gerson and Gabriel Biel have both done much to make Nominalistic theology acceptable: Gerson by including mystical warmth in his theological formulations, Biel by neutralizing the extreme positions of the left-wing. The textbooks of Biel especially brought the *via moderna* to many German universities.[12]

From a survey of the structure of Nominalism as just described, the discernment of the different schools helps us in our search for its essence. Its main line is becoming visible, which enables us to avoid traditional dangers: that of passing judgment on Nominalism on the grounds of extremes, either in epistemological or theological propositions, and that of concentrating one-sidedly on its doctrine of justification. Nominalism is not a doctrinal unity, but a common attitude, on some points at least, of remarkably different strands. One cannot say either that its thought is limited to or exhausted by the doctrine of justification which is only one aspect of the God-man relation. Our announced intention to limit our discussion of Nominalism to the Occam-Biel circle finds its justification partly in the fact that it is in any event the main

[11] Paris BN, lat. 16.535 fol. 179^{r} puts Ripa together with Hugolinus, Bradwardine and Mirecourt. Cf. A. Combes, AHDL, 1956, p. 167.

[12] Unfortunately, since Feckes' much-quoted book on Biel's doctrine of justification and his position in the Nominalistic movement, Occam and Biel have been too closely identified. I hope to show elsewhere in a more detailed study that it really appears time and again that he only *tried* hard to be an obedient disciple of Occam.

stream of the tradition, and partly in the fact that it was this school which exerted the most profound influence on the conception of God and man at the end of the Middle Ages.[13]

III. Characterization

The idea of the *potentia absoluta*, as contrasted with the *potentia ordinata*, of God plays, explicitly or implicitly, a vital part in the theology of all the representatives of the Nominalistic movement. What we should like to suggest is that this idea is the common denominator of four such diverse characteristics as: 1) the sovereignty of God; 2) the immediacy of God; 3) the moral autonomy and freedom of man; 4) an attitude of scepticism which leans toward secularization.

The importance of the idea of *potentia absoluta* has certainly been suggested before, but a wrong understanding of its implications has led many scholars to misinterpret the texts. The problem of *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* of God[14] goes back to the very beginning of scholasticism. Hugh of St. Victor († 1141) stated that God's omnipotence is only limited by the rule that He cannot injure Himself, i.e., by the law of non-contradiction.[15]

The terms themselves date from a later time and are used, among others, by Thomas Aquinas, who summarizes clearly the conclusions reached by the thirteenth century. The *potentia absoluta* is God's omnipotence considered in isolation. The question "utrum Deus possit facere quae non facit"[16] can be answered by saying that God can do this because of His *potentia absoluta*. The *potentia ordinata* can be understood as that which God, by virtue of his moving will, is really going to do or has done. It is right to say that whereas the idea of the *potentia absoluta* had always been a marginal thought, the interests of the Nominalists seem to focus on it. The *irrealis* which indicates what could have happened if God had willed otherwise becomes more and more a *realis*. God's

[13] C. Feckes, Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel, Münster i W, 1925, p. 138; Iserloh, op. cit., p. 8.

[14] Cf. E. Borchert, Der Einflusz des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik, Münster i W., 1940 BB xxx, I, 1 ff.

[15] De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei Ia. cap. 22; PL 176. 214.

[16] ST I. q 25. a 5.

potentia absoluta becomes the power to reverse the natural order of things as in fact is the case with miracles. God is not obliged to obey moral or natural laws. In God Himself is no *potentia ordinata*, says Aureolus, as this is a connotative conception which only regards his *opera ad extra*.[17]

In the succeeding period this statement is echoed time and again in varying tones, expressing the idea: *finiti et infiniti nulla proportio*. We cannot reason backwards from God's revelation to His being. This implies criticism of the theological tradition as far as it erred from the knowledge it could have about God from the Holy Scripture and the Sancti. At the same time, it indicated that the established order as a layer between God and man was not the eternal order it was taken for, but, on the contrary, an order as contingent as creation itself.

As we have analyzed it so far, the *potentia absoluta*-principle seems mainly to have a negative significance, — as it is usually put: the divorce of faith and reason. Many scholars have stopped at this point and, indeed, defined Nominalism as a negative movement. But this is only part of it; one is not allowed to say about the Nominalist as Mandel does: "Gott ist ihm unerkennbar, man kann über ihn nichts aussagen, er wird zu einem X, in dem tausend Möglichkeiten . . . enthalten sind."[18]

In his quest for certainty the Nominalist makes a clear distinction between the revelation of God Himself and human conclusions, but the revelation in creation and in Christ is not attacked or undermined. The distance between God hidden and God revealed does not make the revelation less trustworthy.

Nor can we agree with Feckes when he suggests that the *potentia absoluta* can be equated with theory, the *potentia ordinata* with practice.[19] It is true that these two powers deal with different spheres, not those of theory and practice, however, but rather with

[17] "Sic in Deo nulla est potentia ordinata per respectum ad actionem ad extra, cum nullo ordine obligetur aut debeat agere secundum aliquam exigentiam moralem vel naturalem. Unde sic intelligendo, non est in Deo nisi potentia absoluta ab omni ordine et omni debito, nulli subiecta regula nullo modo ad agere aut ad modum agendi aliquem obligata," I Sent. d 44, a 5, Romae 159b, fol. 1060 a/b.

[18] H. J. Mandel, Die geistesgeschichtliche Stellung der Reformation, Leipzig, 1919, pp. 153 ff.

[19] Op. cit., p. 57; "Es war nicht schwer das was sie nach der *potentia absoluta* sagten, nun auch für die Wirklichkeit zu behaupten," p. 142.

the sphere of faith and the sphere of experience and reason. The *potentia ordinata* treats theology as the "science" concerned with God's revelation; the *potentia absoluta* includes this sphere but has a wider scope. It works with the presupposition that to reach truth we must consider not only what God actually decides to do (*vult facere* = *potentia ordinata*), but also what God is able to do (*potest facere* = *potentia absoluta*).

This latter point of view has both vertical and horizontal aspects. If dealing with the question of what God is able to do, it creates an eschatological openness which reminds one of Joachimism; and, as Occam stands in the tradition of Franciscan spiritualism, this cannot surprise us. As regards the horizontal aspect, it is clear that when reason moves out of the circle of revelation, it enjoys a degree of independence seldom found in medieval thought. It has been said that the consequence of Nominalism is the doctrine of the double truth.[20] Irrespective of the fact that this conception has more merit than is usually thought this can be granted only if it is understood that there is but one truth of which man can be certain, and that is truth as revealed by God.

Metaphysical truth arrived at through deduction, however, can only be tentative. Hence, Occam *cum suis* often suggests several answers of which some may seem more reasonable than others without really deciding the issue. But, ultimately, reason, reaching outside the sphere of faith, can only lay bare innerworldly structures which by axiom are contingent. We may conclude that the *potentia absoluta*-principle delineates not only the sphere of faith but, also, that of reason. These spheres are not absolutely separated, but should, on the contrary, be described as concentric circles — with the important qualification, however, that the inner circle is not formed by an uninterrupted logical arc, but by a set of points which from God's point of view constitute a rational

[20] "Hier liegt der Ausgangspunkt für die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit. Der menschlichen Vernunft kann etwas unvernünftig sein, was der göttlichen Vernunft konform ist." Feckes, op. cit. p. 12, n. 57. The demarcation line, however, lies not between faith and reason but between faith — and love and hope: "Quia fides est virtus intellectualis cuius obiectum est verum. Ideo virtus intellectualis penitus excludit falsum. Spei autem et charitatis . . . non simpliciter excludit errorem." Biel, III Sent. d 23, q 2 E. The limits of God's *potentia absoluta* lie in the law of non-contradiction, which does not imply contradiction with His *potentia ordinata*. Cf. e.g., IV Sent. d 14, q 1, not. 4.

diagram. Philosophy operates primarily within the inner circle of faith not to undermine its authority, but to prove that God's action transcends human reason, even meditative reason.

It is difficult to accept, therefore, the traditional explanation of the use of the *potentia absoluta*-principle as a means of escape for the Nominalist. That is to say, afraid of being accused of heresy, he takes refuge behind the shield of *potentia absoluta*. The idea that this whole movement acted and confessed out of fear is hardly credible in view of the doctrinal freedom before Trent. Besides, Occam and Biel both take pains to indicate in which sphere they are thinking. All too seldom can this be said about those scholars who analyzed their thought! Nor does thinking from the point of view of the *potentia absoluta* lead to "logische Spielereien." It is a most serious task to test how far the realm of revelation contributes to the understanding of the world, taking pains to force neither Scriptural data nor everyday reality.

Although one may well disagree with Erich Hochstetter's comparison of the *potentia absoluta* and *ordinata* with a higher and a lower order, the evidence he produces, to show that the *potentia absoluta* is not meant to undermine the stability of God's actual revelation, gives us reason to hope that this misunderstanding is removed once and for all.[21] Before we can trace the dialectics of the *potentia absoluta*-principle as the common denominator expressing itself in the diverse aspects of the localization of God and man in Nominalism, we have to answer one more question.

Granted that this principle is not meant to upset the established order, can Joseph Lortz and Erwin Iserloh[22] be right in saying that this is the actual result and consequence of Occamistic theology? This is certainly true for the left-wing and its disciples in

[21] "Viator Mundi"; in Aufsätze zu Occams Philosophie und Theologie, Franziskanische Studien, 1950 (32), p. 2; "Ist doch die *potentia ordinata dei* für Ockham, wie schon für Duns Scotus, die gegebene Ordnung der Welt und des Heils, in der Gott als die *causa prima* mit den *causae secundae*, den natürlichen Ursachen, also auch den Menschen zusammenwirkt. Das es über dieser gegebenen Ordnung noch ein höhere Ordnung gibt, in der Gott, *de potentia absoluta*, ohne die *causae secundae* unmittelbar in den Weltgang eingreifen kann *und auch schon eingegriffen hat* (italics mine) bezeugt die Heiligen Schrift und war für Duns und Ockham Kirchliche Lehre, da Bischof Stephan Tempier von Paris 1277 ihre Leugnung ausdrücklich verurteilt hatte." Cf. pp. 18 ff.

[22] J. Lortz, Einleitung to Iserloh's op. cit., p. xxiii and p. xxvi; Iserloh, ib., pp. 49, 99, 107, et passim.

Paris. In addition — with the syncretistic school evidence can be found that a prolonged disputation is more important than the solving of the problem concerned.

Occam's thesis of the irrationality of revelation may *not*, however, be equated with the undermining of the established order, while Biel clearly conforms to tradition by showing the fittingness of God's decisions. The Augustinian right-wing, however, succeeds in balancing theological tradition with the belief that God's will transcends man's understanding.

The four above-mentioned aspects of Nominalistic theology have been singled out in turn as representing the essence of this movement. Although they may seem to contrast, even to oppose each other, they must receive equal consideration if we are to escape the danger of drawing a mere caricature. We are not able to analyze man's moral autonomy and the freedom of his will in isolation without losing our sense of proportion.

A. The Sovereignty of God

The *potentia absoluta*-principle and the adage "finiti et infiniti nulla proportio," lead us to a brief consideration of the Sovereignty of God. Far more clearly than it has been formulated in studies on Thomas Bradwardine it must be stated that one of the main motives of Occam and his school is the idea of God's sovereignty. It is true that Bradwardine called the adherents of this school modern Pelagians but, as far as this point is concerned, he fought on common ground. The already mentioned contrast between the different aspects should not lead us astray in over-emphasizing one at the expense of another.

We have still to consider, however, to what extent the strong emphasis on God's sovereignty results in stating the arbitrariness of His will. On this point[23] we should be as careful as were Occam and Biel. God is indeed "arbitrary" in his *opera ad extra* as far as he has transgressed and can transgress moral and natural law.

[23] Lortz says about Occam: "Die einseitige Betonung von Gottes unbeschränkter Allmacht führt Ockham zum Gott der Willkür, der schlechterdings an nichts und durch nichts, auch nicht durch sein Wesen gebunden ist." Op. cit., p. xxvi. Philotheus Böhner takes another position: "For the Venerabilis Inceptor knows one invariable norm of Ethics, viz. the obligation to obey the will of God or to love God." "A Recent Presentation of Ockham's Philosophy," Franciscan Studies, 9 (1949), pp. 453 f.

What is *per se* an expression of God's liberty seems from the human point of view capriciousness. This, we should like to suggest, explains the much discussed proposition that God can allow someone not to love Him in order that this person can dedicate himself totally to his studies. Although this seems to prove Occam's ethical positivism,[24] we are actually dealing here with an extreme example of this general rule.

Besides, in contrast to Scotus, Occam and Biel are emphatic in stressing God's simplicity, arguing that God's intellect and will coincide with His essence in such a way that His decisions cannot be separated from His being.[25]

Concluding this first aspect of Nominalism, we can agree with Vignaux, who described the *potentia absoluta*-principle as a religio-theological motif of the first order: "Celle-ci consistait, en montrant la contingence de tout ordre de la nature et de la grâce, à rappeler la dépendance de toutes choses à l'égard d'un Principe qui agit avec une liberté, une gratuité souveraine."[26]

B. Immediacy

It would be rewarding to analyze late-medieval thought under the aspect of recovery of the sense of divine immediacy.

We find it in Rhenish mysticism, Eckhart *et alii* with their sense of the "God within" and their identification of the birth of the soul with the birth of Christ: Jesus visits the soul as the bridegroom visits the bride.

We encounter it in Wiclif's mixture of Occamistic irrationalism and Platonic realism. The Church based on election rather than succession bypasses the indirect hierarchical way. Hus and the revolutionary Bohemians add the concept of "blood" to the Wicliffian doctrines, and there is a further stress on the removal of barriers between laity and clergy.

Again, we meet the same in Gerson's conciliarism and sense of the "universal church." The frequency of masses for the dead

[24] M. de Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale, III (Louvain, Paris, 1947), p. 42; Iserloh, op. cit., p. 48.

[25] Biel, I Sent., d 41, q 1, a 1, not. 2 B: "Voluntas [dei] nihil aliud est quam deus ipse."

[26] Nominalisme du XIV^e^ Siècle, Paris, 1948, p. 22. Id. Art. "Occam," DTC XI, Paris, 1931, col. 864 ff. Cf. Luther Commentateur des Sentences, Paris, 1935, p. 78.

in purgatory, the increased activity in the collection of relics, and the laicization of St. Francis' ideals in such movements as the *Devotio Moderna* are all expressions of the same quest for immediacy. And finally, as I hope to show later, we find the same concept in the early Italian Renaissance.

This quest for immediacy takes the shape of hunger for reality in respect to the created world: Nominalistic epistemology attacks the wall between perception and reality which seemed to devaluate reality as a reflection of the universals. Its empiricism opens a new era of secular knowledge as can be observed in the philosophy of nature of John Buridan († 1358) and Nicole Oresme († 1382).

Behind its criticism of the hierarchy of knowledge, however, is the Nominalistic longing to consider God and His relation to the world, not only in terms of the established order, but also in terms of His *potentia absoluta*. What in another context could be called the eschatological awareness in Nominalism can from the point of view of the God-man relationship be called its quest for immediacy.

In the sphere of the *potentia ordinata* God works through the hierarchy of the Church, through her sacraments and clergy. To say that in the light of God's *potentia absoluta* there is a direct way, bypassing the given order, certainly does not dispense with the great distance between God and the individual. It proves that this way is in no sense ontologically compelling. The fact that St. Paul was converted on his journey to Damascus without the media of word and sacrament proves that even the established order points beyond itself to a possible more direct relationship with God.

This directness of God's acting, essentially belonging to the vertical aspect of the sphere of the *potentia absoluta*, when introduced to the given order, causes a short-circuiting. This is the explanation of Holcot's and Mirecourt's determinism and monism. It is not in the right-wing — a conception of remarkable tenacity — but in the left-wing of Nominalism that the Almighty God governs His creation so immediately that God is even made responsible for the evil deeds of man.

The doctrine of coefficiency as formulated by Thomas Bradwardine indicates that the idea that no act is performed without God's creative and redeeming *concursus* is compatible with the freedom of the human will. This leads us to the third characteristic of Nominalism: the moral autonomy of man and his freedom.

C. The Autonomy of Man

At the outset we must realize that at this point the right-wing finds itself deeply opposed to the main current of Nominalism. Instead of an autonomous anthropology it states a theonomous anthropology which sees in God not the opponent but the creator, preserver, and cause of man's freedom. For Occam and Biel, however, man's freedom stems from man's position in the world.

One can describe the revealed order in two ways. On the one hand, it marks the border of the realm in which God Almighty rules directly. Thus it offers the security of the path of revealed law and order on which the *viator* journeys toward the eternal Jerusalem. On the other hand, its ontological basis has given way under the criticism of the *potentia absoluta*-principle. The Word, Sacraments, and clergy of the Church have undergone the metamorphosis from vessels for growing participation in God's being through justification to mere requirements for graduation to eternal bliss. The supernatural world, instead of accompanying and nourishing the *viator*, has receded and has become a hemisphere, a dome.

This dome shuts out the world of God's non-realized possibilities and provides room on the inside for man's own realm, in which he, as the image of God, thinks and acts. This thinking, though never able to reach unshakeable truth outside this domain, can, nevertheless, transcend the dome; this acting, however good, can never go beyond this boundary line. Here this acting *ex puris naturalibus* has to be promoted by God Himself from moral goodness to meritorious goodness.

We will briefly describe man's autonomy within his domain from the point of view of the doctrine of a) predestination, b) habit, and c) Mariology.

a.) The doctrine of predestination seems to threaten this conception of man's autonomy directly. Staying in the Franciscan-Augustinian tradition, Nominalism had to face the problems resulting from this, especially as Duns Scotus had so strongly defended the *praedestinatio ante praevisa merita*.[27]

[27] "Nach Thomas für den Vorherbestimmung ein Entwurf des praktischen Intellektes ist, setzt Gott die Kreaturen in Bewegung auf das Ziel hin. Nach Skotus, für den Vorherbestimmung Wahl des Willens ist, akzeptiert Gott die Kreatur für das

Two steps brought Nominalism out of this danger area. First it was shown that God's foreknowledge was, in fact, afterknowledge, by way of the so-called "three-value logic." This means that three things can be said about a proposition regarding the future: such a proposition is 1) true, 2) not true, or 3) simultaneously true and not true, which issue is only decided when the future becomes present.

This conception, of course, takes the element of willing reason out of God's foreknowledge as He also has to wait to see what eventually will happen. The second step is that predestination is identified with foreknowledge. Occam proceeds here from the principle "Deus non prius est ultor quam aliquis sit peccator," which is also applied to the relation between glory and justification.[28]

The combination of the "three-value logic" and the predestination *post praevisa merita* grants man a radical freedom which is quite clearly a reaction against what the Nominalists felt to be Thomas' — and in a lesser degree — Duns' determinism.

There are innumerable fourteenth- and fifteenth-century treatises dealing with this problem of predestination and future contingents which generally give a fierce defense of the autonomy of man. As we said before, this does not apply to the right-wing, but even with such an Augustinian as Gerson we can find traces of this attitude.[29]

This voluntaristic anthropology cannot be explained on the grounds of the doctrine of God. On the contrary, the sovereignty of God, as understood by the Nominalist, would lead to an absolute determinism. As Occam says himself, it is the experience of the contingent character of our world which "necessitates" the freedom of man.[30]

Ziel." W. Pannenberg, Die Praedestinationslehre des Duns Skotus, Göttingen, 1954, p. 42.

[28] I Sent. d 41, q 1 E.

[29] "Causa igitur obdurationis est voluntas avertens et haec initiat; voluntas resistens et haec contineat; culpa promerens — et haec confirmat; Deus gratiam non dans — et haec non liberat; deus iuste punens — et haec ordinat." De Praedestinatione, Köln, 1483 (Hain 7621) II, 308 b.

[30] ". . . . . inquirendum est quomodo et unde contingat contingentia in rebus; pro quo sit ista conclusio: contingentia effectus praesupponit libertatem alicuius causae agentis." I Sent. d 38, q 1, a 7 (F).

By way of the *potentia absoluta*-principle this freedom is brought in accordance with the sovereignty of God. The contingent character of our world can be explained by the innumerable possibilities which God could have chosen to actualize His purposes, in addition to the one which he actually did choose.

b.) The Nominalistic protest against the medieval *habitus*-doctrine is another way in which its appreciation of autonomy is shown. Aureolus bore the brunt of the attack for his defense of the infused *habitus* of grace as required for the ultimate glorification of the *viator*.

Usually this attack is interpreted as a defense of the sovereignty of God, and, indeed, we find Occam and Biel saying: God is no one's debtor. There is no direct proportion between God's reward and the status of man; God is in no way obliged to reward man.

We believe that it is the divine acceptation — God's acceptance of man and his works as worthy of heaven — that expresses this concern, and that it in its turn can make the *habitus* superfluous.

Attention may be called to another motive behind the attack against the *habitus* of grace — that is, that the supernatural information of the will might endanger its freedom. This is brought out by Occam when he says: "Besides, no deed is meritorious unless it be in our power to perform it. . . . *Ergo*, not grace (*habitus*) is the main reason for the meritoriousness of an act, but the free will which causes this deed. *Ergo*, God can accept such an act . . . without this grace (*habitus*)."[31]

It is for this reason that the Nominalists again and again discuss the question "what can man perform" *ex puris naturalibus*, a term which Biel defines as not excluding God's general rule of the world, but only His supernatural, informing grace.[32] Here not sin but grace appears to be the rival of freedom, and it is on this point that the Nominalist break with medieval tradition takes place. Sin is not a power *per se*, depreciating the powers of the will, but only so in relation to God. Grace, always understood as

[31] "Praeterea nihil est meritorium, nisi quod est in nostra potestate, sed illa caritas non est in nostra potestate, ergo actus non est meritorius principaliter propter illam gratiam sed propter voluntatem libere causantem, ergo posset deus talem actum elicitum a voluntate acceptare sine tali gratia." Quod libet VI, q 7.

[32] "Sed per pura naturalia intelligitur animae natura seu substantia cum qualitatibus et actionibus consequentibus naturam, exclusis habitibus ac donis supernaturaliter a solo deo infusis." I Sent. d 28, q 1, a 1, n 2.

the neutralizer of sin, does not liberate and heal the will; but it is only a status required of man by God, making grace a harmless competitor of free will. It would not be difficult to give a long list of quotations to substantiate this. A most revealing one is Occam's example of the pagan brought up in Christian surroundings, believing all the articles of faith, but being a pagan — believing without the grace-*habitus*.[33] Man is *per se* able and free to fulfill the commandments and even — both Occam and Biel go this far — to love God not for our, but for His, sake, *ex puris naturalibus*, without the help of grace.

This does not mean that Occam and Biel teach that man can earn his own salvation — the acceptation idea is meant to rule this out — but that man has complete autonomy within the dome.

c.) There is a third way in which the autonomy of man is brought out in Nominalism. To the complicated history of Mariology the Nominalists have made a distinct contribution. We cannot analyze this within the framework of this paper; but we do want to draw attention to the Nominalistic emphasis on Mary's acceptation of her rôle as the Mother of the Son of God, related as this is to its departure from Scotus' doctrine of predestination.

Although Duns does not speak about Mary's predestination explicitly, he clearly deals with it, as have many Franciscan theologians since the fourteenth century, within the context of the *praedestinatio absoluta Christi*.[34]

Because of the fact that this divine act of predestination takes place before the creation of the world, *ante praevisa merita*, Duns cannot envision Mary's willingness in any other way than that it is caused by the grace of God and is only instrumental for her task and eternal reward.

As we saw, the Nominalistic approach to predestination is characterized by its emphasis on God's foreknowledge, on the one hand, and the unpredictability of the future contingents, on the other. It is too easy to say that Occam and Biel made from predestination foreknowledge, and consequently, built their Mariology on Mary's willingness to execute God's will precisely. For

[33] III Sent. q 8 B, cf. q 8 D.

[34] Cf. E. Longpré, O.F.M., L'Assomption et l'Ecole Franciscaine, in Vers le Dogme de l'Assomption, Montreal, 1958, pp. 208 f.

Mary, as for Paul, Occam makes an exception to the general rule that there is a *ratio praedestinationis* for God according to His revealed will.[35]

Here again, St. Paul and Mary serve Occam to bring forward Scriptural evidence that God is not tied down by His own rules. But this interest in the *ratio praedistinationis* of others comes to the fore in his Mariology by way of stressing Mary's willingness.

One of the moot points in fourteenth-century theological discussions is the immaculate conception of Mary. This question was usually analyzed in three steps: whether it was possible (*potuit*), fitting (*decuit*), and a historical fact (*de facto fuit*). In an outstanding article Father Aquilinus Emmen, O.F.M., shows that some of the authors, one of them Aureolus, single out this middle term "fittingness" (*decuit*), using, together with Occam and Biel, the argument that God does not bypass those who prepare themselves fittingly.[36]

The *popular* Protestant criticism of Roman Catholic Mariology, pointing to the separation of Mariology and Christology and the resulting interest in Mary's individual qualities, seems only to be justified as far as it regards the Nominalistic interpretation! In the presentation of Mary we meet again with a Nominalistic emphasis on the autonomy of man.[37]

Summarizing our analysis of Nominalistic anthropology we may conclude, in the light of its *habitus*-doctrine, its conception of predestination and its Mariology, that it can be defined as autonomous.

[35] "Causa autem quare istos [Paul and Mary] praedestinat sine omni ratione et alios propter rationem non est nisi divina voluntas." I Sent. d 41, col. 5, fol. 7.

[36] Cautiously he states: "Bei einigen der besprochenen Autoren hat man zuweilen den Eindruck, die angeführten Kongruenzgründe fanden ihren eigentlichen Stützpunkt in Maria selbst und in ihrer Ehre. Das wäre aber eine bedauernswerte Akzentverschiebung!" "Einführung in die Mariologie der Oxforder Franziskanerschule," Franz. Stud. 39 (1957), p. 157.

Cf. Id., "Maria's koningschap volgens de Oosterse Vaders," Verslagboek der 13e Mariale Dagen te Tongerlo 1955, Tongerlo, 1956, pp. 84–88.

[37] An unpublished and little noticed Vienna Ms includes a treatise on the cause of predestination and reprobation which, I am convinced, if not a work of Bradwardine, is certainly Bradwardinian. On many points it attacks the Nominalistic autonomous anthropology. In connection with our question of Mary's fittingness it says: ". . . . si non esset personarum acceptio apud Deum tunc si alia filia de domo Iacob consimilis fuisset in merito cum Domina mea ipsa similiter Filium Dei genuisset, et tunc plures potuissent genuisse eundem Filium Dei, et sic etiam Domina Mea non per electionem nec divinam providentiam sed fortuitu et creaturaliter facta fuisset mater Dei." Nat. Bibl. Vienna Cod. 4306. fol. 102r.

Using the *potentia absoluta* of God as the common denominator, this is related to the two mentioned characteristics: the sovereignty of God and the quest for divine immediacy. Although these two seem to oppose autonomy, it is the *potentia absoluta* in the form of the dome-motif which creates the possibility for the *viator* to find his own way, unhampered by the supernatural world. With its voluntarism Nominalism is a continuation of the Franciscan school tradition[38] with a Scotistic turn toward individualism.[39] While the miscalculations of the pagan philosophers proved the unreliability of human reason, the will (in the Occam-Biel line) is more independent and free than ever it was in the Franciscan-Augustinian tradition.

Sin is involved not in the nature of man himself, but only in his relationship with God. Within the dome man is free, even free to love God for His own sake. Some weak rays shine through the roof of the dome, but this exemplifies no more than God's general *concursus*.[40] God is so distant that man's actions cannot be judged according to God's absolute standards, but only according to the contingent circumstances in which acts take place.[41]

In his own realm man is free to choose between good and evil, and under the dome he is alone.

D. Scepticism — Secularization

In his loneliness Nominalistic man is anxious to keep close to the reality of the world around him, an anxiety quite naturally accompanied by a secularization of his interests. Man is still the

[38] ". . . . unde illa potentia dicitur esse libera quae dominium habet plenum tam respectu objecti quam respectu actus proprii."

St. Bonaventura, II Sent. d 25, p 1, a 1, q 7; Ib. ad 4: "Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus quo vis motiva movet se ipsam." Quoted by William G. Thompson, S.J., "Free Choice in St. Bonaventura," Franc. Stud. 18 (1958), pp. 3, 4.

[39] Note that Duns Scotus introduces the term *ultima solitudo* in his definition of the person. Opera Ox. III d 1, q 1, nb. 1.

[40] "Cum loquimur de puris naturalibus, nonexcluditur generalis Dei influentia. . . . Sed per pura naturalia intelligitur animae natura seu substantia cum qualitatibus et actionibus consequentibus naturam exclusis habitibus ac donis supernaturaliter a solo deo infusis." Gabriel Biel, II Sent. d 28, q 1, a 1, n 2.

[41] Occam agrees with Scotus "quod substantia actus virtuosi et vitiosi potest esse eadem, sed dicitur esse virtuosus propter conformitatem ad circumstantias requisitas. . . ." III Sent. q 13, C.

Cf. the sharp analysis of Iserloh, op cit., p. 61.

viator to the heavenly Jerusalem, but his newly won freedom gives him the heavy responsibility of guarding against hallucinations. He can no longer afford to keep his eyes constantly on his ultimate goal, as did the Augustinian man, nor to trust his reason to the same extent as did the Thomistic man. We must view Nominalistic scepticism in this light, and we should beware of singling it out as the main characteristic of this movement.

Although we disagree with Böhner when he goes to the opposite extreme, that of denying the sceptical character of Nominalism altogether,[42] it is certainly true to say that this is not the tired Hellenistic scepticism but the vital scepticism which we have come to acknowledge as prerequisite for a sound scientific attitude. This provides the link to the above-indicated secularization of the school of arts, represented by Buridan and Oresme.

At the same time, we grant Joseph Lortz his contention that this vital scepticism in the course of history endangered the religious character of the theological enterprise.[43]

IV. Conclusion

In his Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, after having dealt with the autonomy and freedom of man as concerns Ficino, Pico and Pomponazzi, Paul Oskar Kristeller concludes: "These ideas were never entirely forgotten during the Middle Ages. But we are under the impression that since the beginning of Renaissance humanism the emphasis on man becomes more persistent, more systematic, and more conclusive.[44]

It would be well to point out that there is reason to extend this statement to Nominalism as a concurrent movement, while, at the same time, indicating the restrictions under which this extension is permissible.

[42] "The notitia intuitiva of non-existents according to William Ockham," Traditio 1 (1943), pp. 223 ff.; "The realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," Traditio 4 (1946), pp. 307 ff. Both articles are republished in Ph. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M., St. Bonaventura, 1950, pp. 268 ff.; pp. 156 ff.

[43] "Man muss sehen und sagen, dass bei Ockham eine geradezu ungeheuerlichen Häufung der neugierigen Fragen und Antworten in endlosem Zug auftaucht und ernstestens ohne genügenden religiösen Bezug diskutiert wird." Einleitung, op. cit., p. xxxi.

[44] Op. cit., p. 284.

Neither Italian Humanism nor Nominalism teaches the self-sufficiency and absolute autonomy of man. The introduction of God's grace in both systems indicates that man *per se* is not complete. But there is a striking identity in their common emphasis on man's individuality; in both systems man ends up going his own way — be it in a horizontal or vertical direction. Let us leave aside the obvious parallel between Occam's and Biel's scepticism and some similar traits of Ficino and Pico, fully worked out by Pomponazzi. This would not, as we suggested, be to deal with the central thrust of these movements. It is the freedom and autonomy of man — whether expressed as independence from nature, cosmos or God — which makes of Nominalism and the early Italian Renaissance parallel movements.

Anthropology — like philosophy in general — was still in an undeveloped stage in the earlier part of the Renaissance. It was in the second part of the fifteenth century that a distinct expression of the long-time implicit belief in human autonomy and freedom was given.

We call attention to Marsilio Ficino († 1499) and Pico della Mirandola († 1494) not because they constitute one disciplined school of thought, but because they stand in contrast to the preceding period, which is characterized by what is now generally called "classical humanism," and in contrast to the succeeding period, which cannot be qualified with equal right as a rebirth of Plato and Aristotle.

While in Nominalism epistemology was shown to be a consequence of its concept of God and man, the too often isolated conception of man's freedom in the Renaissance should be analyzed in direct connection with its epistemology.

"With Ficino the glorification of man assumes a more definite philosophical significance. He emphasizes mainly two aspects: man's universality and his central position. Man's universality is reflected in his relation to all parts of the universe and in his unlimited aspirations. His position in the center of the universe, moreover, gives man an importance unrivaled by any other being except by God Himself."[45]

[45] P. O. Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Rome, 1956, p. 284.

One can say that Ficino's man is the microcosmos and is placed in the hierarchy of Being where he experiences the tension between ascent and descent. But Ficino's man is, at the same time, the man Ficino; in other words, his metaphysics are to be understood "from the phenomenon of internal experience or internal consciousness."[46]

The experienced tension is that between the nostalgia of the soul for the celestial Fatherland and the impulses and needs of the body. This tension has not merely psychological, but also ontological significance: man is the middle term between God to Whom he should ascend and the created world over which he is appointed to rule as a god. It has been remarked that in Renaissance thought God received human epithets and man divine epithets; and, indeed, man is again and again described as "little less than the angels."

One aspect of this — and here epistemology becomes important — is that man by way of contemplation of the Intelligibles or Ideas can rise to the knowledge of God Himself. While it is true that all beings have a natural appetite for their own good, only man can transcend the corporeal world and can therefore have more than an appetite for finite good. In this context it appears that, in contrast to the irrational appetite which necessarily follows sensation, the will as rational appetite follows the Intellect and is thus utterly dependent on it.

As the rational appetite, will is identified with the cognitive process, involved in drawing a particular judgment from a universal proposition which results in a choice. Therefore, it is important for the understanding of Ficino to read the single words "reason" or "will" as the compound "reason-will."

Finally, it should be added that in the final rise of the soul from the Ideas to God it is the will without reason which takes the initiative independent of the Intellect. The will, drawn by the intellect to the heights of the Ideas, is raised the rest of the way by God. Although the superiority of will and love over the intellect seems to be Ficino's more mature theory, the will before this rapture operates within the cognitive dimension.

From the fact that man in this life never can reach his proper end in temporal existence, Ficino contends that the soul must be

[46] Id.: The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, New York, 1943, p. 206.

possessed of immortality by nature; but, granting that the greater share of human souls enter into this eternal bliss, he is careful to point out that this is not true in every case. For us it is important to note that it is not the will of man which is the source of his damnation. The will always desires the highest good in desiring its own good and is, therefore, not ontologically deficient. The fact that sin is not a result of *corrupted* will, but rather of *misguided* will, indicates again that in Ficino's emphasis on the dignity of man the concept of free will is integrated in the cognitive sphere.

We can say that salvation is not much more than a question of proper education. Divine contemplation, it is true, is a product of an act of grace while the soul is yet in the body; but, even here, it is man through his own initiative who goes more than half way. Man depends primarily on himself for his salvation; in this venture he is not dependent on the Church with its sacraments, nor even on God Himself. Man goes his way, somewhat melancholy and alone; but he can do so with little fear of failure because his ultimate arrival in the celestial sphere is the natural fulfillment of his natural desire.

In Pico, Ficino's most famous disciple, one encounters philosophical ideas which in their general outline bear strong resemblance to those of Ficino.

Although Ficino's three layers: God, Man, Nature, are less sharply distinguished, Pico's man is still the center of the world. In the first part of the Oration on the Dignity of Man[47] man is considered a being created subsequent to and apart from the rest of the creation for the purpose of ruling and appreciating the world which God created. Once separated from the order of being, man's nature loses the ontological limitations it possessed for Ficino: "Neither a fixed abode," Pico's God tells man, "nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire."[48]

Although for Pico the three layers are there, and although he

[47] Translation by Elizabeth Forbes, in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer et al., Chicago, 1948, pp. 223–25.

[48] Op. cit., p. 224.

accepts salvation as the chief aim of man's earthly life, man is far more horizontally interested.

A joy of sheer activity that we are tempted to call Calvinistic replaces the mystical desire to flee the world: "We prefer constantly to seek through knowledge, never finding what we seek, rather than to possess through love that which without love would be in vain."[49]

This change of emphasis goes together with another difference. Ficino's definition of man circles around his capacity to reason; for Pico the human ego is not centered in reason, but rather in will. As far as reason goes, Pico could say "finiti et infiniti nulla proportio." The intellect at its peak of development can know God's infinite attributes; but to know these is not to know God; ". . . all that we say and perceive thus is a mere trifle, considering the infinite distance which separates Divinity from the capacity of our minds."[50] Alone in the creative power of our will we have a faculty which, like God's, is infinite, absolutely free, and perfect, and it is through this common faculty that we should ultimately come to his presence. The union is effected through our capacity to love, which for Pico is a central operation of the will.

Again, the extent to which the individual achieves perfection in his actions depends not on the will which always desires the good, but upon the extent of the knowable. The intellect and reason can lead the will to the threshold of heaven. From there, not the will, but God Himself replaces the cognitive power as the guide of the will; and, as an act of grace, He reveals Himself as the ultimate good sought by the infinite desire of the will.

We can in part repeat what we said about Ficino — that salvation is not much more than a question of proper education. Although love has replaced contemplation and the ontological layers are barely visible, free will is integrated in the cognitive sphere. The nearest Pico comes to the concept of original sin is when he confesses that in this world we never find what we seek. God's grace does not change the will, but removes its cognitive limitations. Except for the final act of God's grace the question of man's temporary possession of God within this life and of the

[49] On Being and Unity, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts, 3, Marquette, 1943, p. 25.
[50] Ib., p. 23.

eternal vision of God after death is a matter of man's own efforts. As with Ficino salvation is not acquired through the Church and her Sacraments but depends on man's own initiative. Without a trace of melancholy man goes alone through a world he enjoys, certain that the same will happen in the world to come.

It has often been suggested that the development of individualism at the end of the Middle Ages was caused by the slackening of the ties with the Church and by a desanctifying (*Entsakralisierung*) of its functions.[51] There are two considerations, however, which should warn us to be cautious. First, there is sufficient evidence to believe that there was a more common interest in the sacred sphere at the end of the Middle Ages than at its height. Secondly, this movement of increasing individualism did not break out in numbers, as did the Reformation, but was for a long time limited to small learned circles at universities and later at courts of princes.

Attention should be called to the common reaction of Nominalism and Italian Renaissance against Averroism, which by necessity was an interest of the happy few. The condemnations of 1270 and 1277 are a recurring motif in the writings of the Nominalists while for Ficino, Pico and Pomponazzi, the Padua-school was a physical reality. This Averroism which taught a subtle determinism and denied personal immortality was in its determinism offensive to the Nominalist; in its denial of the immortality of the soul offensive to the Italian humanist; for its attack on the dignity of man offensive to both.

A second point at issue is the analogy of the dome-motif and the three-layer motif. Although these seem different at first sight, in both structures man has his own realm in which he is the *Deus in terris*.[52]

While it may be that the immanence of God is exemplified in the hierarchy of being, if we go from Ficino to Pico and then to Pomponazzi, this immanence becomes first less essential, and

[51] Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Band II: Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation. Ed. Georg Misch, Auflage 5, Vanden Hoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1957, pp. 324 ff., 416 ff., 496 f. Cf. more explicit Joseph Lortz, Die Reformation in Deutschland I², Freiburg i.B., 1941, pp. 174 f.

[52] Cf. P. O. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, p. 81.

finally invisible. In both systems man as the vicar of God reigns in his own domain; the Church which accompanied medieval man from cradle to grave is not abolished, but integrated and adapted to this anthropology. Only beyond the top layer and beyond the roof of the dome does man need God's gracious mediation.

Here we touch on a third point of basic agreement on the dignity of man. The traditional definition of the God-man relationship in terms of sin and grace is thoroughly revised. In both movements the concept of grace is not lost but moved to the margin. As its natural antipode sin no longer marks the need of God's saving presence but has become naturalized as the tragic consequence of man's aloneness in this world. In Nominalism it is the unpleasant, but surmountable, consequence of a decree of God which has no metaphysical ramifications. In the Italian Renaissance it is the tragedy of our restless existence, bound as we are to the limits of our body, and the lack of insight on the part of reason and Intellect which thus misguides the will.

This thesis should, however, be qualified by two restrictions. The adage "finiti et infiniti nulla proportio" is brought to bear by the Nominalist on the systems of both Plato and Aristotle, meaning that he did away with exactly that form of epistemology which proved to be so central for the representatives of the Italian Renaissance. Ultimately this marks the difference between a rational and an irrational philosophical frame of reference. In Nominalism the double road of contemplation and love — in the sense of *eros* — is narrowed down to the single road of *eros*, love *ex puris naturalibus*.

A second, and related, restriction should be observed in the differing points of departure. For Nominalism it is the omnipotence of God and the dialectics of his *potentia absoluta* which proved to be the common denominator of its four major aspects. These aspects themselves — sovereignty of God, quest for divine immediacy, autonomy and freedom of man, and finally scepticism — we can find also in the early Italian Renaissance.

As we have seen, the *potentia absoluta*-principle, as the hallmark of Nominalism, indicates that the dome within which man reigns is a sign of God's omnipotence. While the three-layer anthropology of Italian humanism is the expression of the essence

of man himself, the Nominalistic dome marks the contingent way in which God expressed His will. Man's dignity is not the result of his participation in being, but of God's decision to grant him this realm of freedom.

Qualified by these two restrictions, Nominalism and the early Italian Renaissance share a persistent, systematic, and conclusive emphasis on the autonomy and freedom of man.

WHO WROTE 'THE SUPPER OF THE LORD'?

W. D. J. CARGILL THOMPSON
King's College, Cambridge

I

The Short-Title Catalogue includes in its list of Tyndale's works a pamphlet called 'The Supper of the Lord,' which was originally published anonymously on the continent in 1533, under the fictitious imprint of Nicholas Twonson of Nuremberg.[1] But there are serious objections against accepting Tyndale's authorship. Although the pamphlet was reprinted several times during the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, it did not finally appear under Tyndale's name until 1573, when John Foxe included it in his edition of the works of Tyndale, Frith and Barnes. During the sixteenth century it was widely believed that 'The Supper of the Lord' was the work of George Joye, one of the lesser figures of the English reformation who is now largely forgotten. But although the weight of the evidence seems to support this belief, the glamor of Tyndale's name has prevented the question from being investigated properly.

Since the early nineteenth century Tyndale's authorship has generally been accepted. Christopher Anderson, in 'The Annals of the English Bible' (1845), had little hesitation in pronouncing 'The Supper of the Lord' to be Tyndale's.[2] It was reprinted among Tyndale's works by Thomas Russell in his ill-fated edition

[1] The full title of the original edition is "The Souper/of the Lorde./ wher unto, that thou mayst be the better pre-/pared and suerlyer instructed: have here/ firste the declaracion of the later par-/te of the 6 ca. of S. Johã, beginnin-/ge at the letter C the fowerth ly-/ne before the crosse, at these wor-/dis: Verely, vere. &c wheryn/incidently M. Moris let-/ter agenst Johan Fry-/the is confu-/ted." The colophon reads "Imprinted at Nornburg, by Niclas twonson, 5 April. An.1533." However, no printer of this name is known and it clearly belongs to the category of English protestant books which were printed in the Low Countries with fictitious imprints. Miss Kronenberg suggests that the real printer was Symon Cock of Antwerp, who published several other works for English reformers, also without giving his name. M. E. Kronenberg, "Forged Addresses in Low Country Books in the Period of the Reformation," The Library, Fifth Series, II (Oxford, 1948), p. 89.

[2] C. Anderson, The Annals of the English Bible (London, 1845), I, pp. 349–350, 354–356.

of the Works of the English Reformers,[3] and by Henry Walter in the Parker Society edition.[4] Walter himself was aware that the case for attributing the work to Tyndale was not completely established and he became increasingly undecided about it the more he studied the problem. When he wrote the biographical introduction to the first volume of the Parker Society edition, he accepted the view that 'The Supper of the Lord' was by Tyndale without much question.[5] But by the time the third volume, which contains 'The Supper of the Lord,' appeared, Walter had become much more hesitant. In his introductory note to 'The Supper' he went at length into the objections to Tyndale's authorship; but although he avoided making any definitive pronouncement, the tone of his remarks implied that the book was to be accepted as the work of Tyndale.[6] Subsequently, however, his doubts became even more pronounced, and in a brief article in Notes and Queries, published while the third volume was still in the press, he put forward the tentative suggestion that the book ought properly to be attributed to Joye.[7] Nevertheless the difficulties involved in accepting Tyndale's authorship, which Walter pointed out, have largely been ignored by subsequent writers. On the strength of Walter's preface to 'The Supper' and a misreading of his article in Notes and Queries, Demaus declared in his life of Tyndale (1872) that "on the whole, however, it now seems agreed that the work was Tyndale's, this conviction being strengthened by the fact that Joye, whose self-conceit was boundless, does not claim the authorship of it as he certainly would have done had the work been his." [8] J. F. Mozley, the author of the most recent biography

[3] The Works of the English Reformers — William Tyndale and John Frith, edited by Thomas Russell (London, 1831), III, pp. 17–69.

[4] The Works of William Tyndale, edited by Henry Walter (3 Volumes, Parker Society, Cambridge, 1848–1850), III, pp. 217–268.

[5] Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises (Parker Society, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1848). "Biographical Notice of William Tyndale," p. lvii.

[6] Tyndale, An Answer to Sir Thomas More's Dialogue, &c. (Parker Society, Vol. III, Cambridge, 1850), pp. 218–221.

[7] "I do not wish, however, to be considered as positively affirming the treatise to be Tyndale's. . . . But still there are objections of such force, that I must confess myself rather inclined to attribute the treatise to Joye's pen, if I could but be satisfied that he was capable of writing so correctly, and of keeping so clear of vulgarity in a controversy with a popish persecutor." Notes and Queries, First Series, No. 23, April 6, 1850, p. 363.

[8] R. Demaus, William Tyndale (London, 1872), p. 367, and footnote.

of Tyndale,[9] and Canon Greenslade, in his selection of Tyndale's writings,[10] both take the same view. The only serious support for Joye's claims is to be found in the article on him in the Dictionary of National Biography and this is counterbalanced by the authority of the Short-Title Catalogue.

Yet in the sixteenth century Joye's claims received as much support as Tyndale's. The work, which had been written as an answer to More's 'Letter Impugning the Erroneous Writing of John Frith,' was ostensibly anonymous. It concludes with a brief but unconvincing apology, in which the author excuses himself from giving his name on the specious ground that while More himself was aware of his identity, the public was only interested in the contents of the book. "I would have thereto put my name, good reader, but I know well that thou regardest not who writeth but what is written: thou esteemest the word of the verity, and not of the author. And as for M. Mocke, whom the verity most offendeth, and doth but mock it out when he cannot soil it, he knoweth my name well enough." [11] But in spite of this façade of anonymity, contemporaries seem to have had little doubt that 'The Supper of the Lord' was the work of either Tyndale or Joye. More himself gave arguments for attributing it to each of them in the preface to his rejoinder, 'The Answer to the First Part of a Poisoned Book which a Nameless Heretic hath named The Supper of the Lord,' where he discussed the matter at some length.[12] How-

[9] "Thomas More also leaves the matter open. But he evidently suspects that he is dealing with Tyndale, and he was almost certainly right," J. F. Mozley, William Tyndale (London, 1937), p. 253. Mozley also discussed the matter in an article, entitled "Tyndale's Supper of the Lord" in Notes and Queries, CLXXXIII, 21 November 1942, pp. 205–206. Here he argues very strongly that 'The Supper of the Lord' was the work of Tyndale, but he offers no new external evidence.

[10] "Tyndale now joined in the fray, for on 5th. April, there was published an anonymous work *The Supper of the Lord*, which may with great probability be ascribed to him." The Work of William Tyndale, edited by S. L. Greenslade (London, 1938), Introduction, p. 15. However, when discussing the work later on, he is careful to state that Tyndale's authorship is not absolutely certain, see p. 45.

[11] Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 267. In all sixteenth century editions after the first, "M. Mocke" was changed to "M. More." In the Parker Society text of Tyndale's works the spelling has been modernized, and for the sake of uniformity I have followed this practice in all passages quoted in this article, even when sixteenth century editions have been used.

[12] Sir Thomas More, "The Answer to the First Part of a Poisoned Book which a Nameless Heretic hath Named The Supper of the Lord," printed in The Works of Sir Thomas More (London, 1557), pp. 1036–1037.

ever, he refused to decide between them, protesting that it was unreasonable to expect him to be able to distinguish the work of one anonymous heretic from another. Although John Foxe in 1573 included 'The Supper of the Lord' in his edition of Tyndale's works, John Bale attributed it in both editions of his 'Catalogue of British Authors' to Joye.[13] At the time of its appearance the authorities took the same view. In a list of condemned books issued in 1542, it is described as "The Supper of the Lord, of George Joye's doing." [14]

II

The case for attributing 'The Supper of the Lord' to Tyndale rests largely on the testimony of Foxe and More, yet the evidence of neither is conclusive. In the first place, little weight can be attached to the fact that Foxe printed 'The Supper of the Lord' in Day's folio edition of The Works of Tyndale, Frith and Barnes. For instead of including it among the rest of Tyndale's works, he published 'The Supper' as an appendix after Tyndale's letters to Frith.[15] At the same time he made it clear that he had no intention of committing himself on the question of its authorship. After the second letter to Frith, the last item which Foxe recognized as indisputably genuine, there is the colophon — "The end of all M. W. Tyndale's Works, newly imprinted according to his first copies, which he himself set forth." [16] This is followed by a short preface to 'The Supper of the Lord,' which implies that Foxe's only reason for including it was hearsay and that he himself was very doubtful whether Tyndale was, in fact, the author. "Here followeth a short and pithy treatise touching the Lord's Supper compiled as some do gather, by M. W. Tyndale, because the method and phrase agree with his, and the time of writing are concurrent; which for thy further instruction and learning, gentle

[13] John Bale, Illustrium Maioris Britanniae Scriptorum Summarium (Ipswich, 1548), p. 240: John Bale, Scriptorum Illustrium Majoris Britanniae Catalogus (Basle, 1557), p. 721.

[14] Gilbert Burnet, History of the Reformation, edited by Nicholas Pocock (7 volumes, Oxford, 1865), IV, p. 518.

[15] The Whole Works of Tyndale, Frith and Barnes (London, 1573), "Tyndale's Works," p. 457.

[16] Ibid., p. 456.

reader, I have annexed to his works, lest the church of God should want any of the painful travails of godly men, whose only cure and endeavour was to advance the glory of God and to further the salvation of Christ's flock committed to their charge." [17]

It is also significant that Foxe does not mention 'The Supper of the Lord' in his account of Tyndale's life in the 'Acts and Monuments.' He does state there that Tyndale wrote a treatise on the sacraments, but adds that he put it aside and refrained from publishing it, on the ground that the people were not yet prepared for such advanced teaching.[18] The work which he describes must refer to another book of Tyndale's on the sacraments, whose authorship has never been in question, 'A Fruitful and Godly Treatise on the Sacraments:' [19] for there is no suggestion in Foxe's memoir that Tyndale composed two works on the sacraments.

The evidence of More's 'Answer to the First Part of a Poisoned

[17] Ibid., p. 456.

[18] "Amongst his other books which he compiled, one work he made also for the declaration of the sacrament (as it was then called) of the altar; which he kept by him, considering how the people were not as yet fully persuaded in other matters tending to superstitious ceremonies and gross idolatry. . . . Wherefore Master Tyndale, being a man both prudent in his doings, and no less zealous in the setting forth of God's holy truth after such sort as it might take most effect with the people, did forbear the putting forth of that work, not doubting but, by God's merciful grace, a time should come to have that abomination openly declared as it is at this present day: the Lord Almighty be always praised therefore, Amen!" John Foxe, Acts and Monuments, edited by S. R. Cattley (8 volumes, London, 1837–1841), V, p. 119.

[19] In Foxe's edition of The Whole Works of Tyndale, Frith and Barnes, the title is given as 'A Fruitful and Godly Treatise expressing the right institution and usage of the Sacrament of Baptism and the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Our Saviour Jesu Christ.' But the earliest edition to survive (Printed by R. Stoughton, c. 1548) was published under the title of 'A Brief Declaration of the Sacraments; expressing the first original, how they came up and were institute, with the true and most sincere meaning and understanding of the same, very necessary for all men that will not err in the true use and meaning thereof, compiled by the godly learned man, William Tyndale.' This edition is undated, but cannot have appeared before 1548, when Stoughton started printing. In consequence, it has usually been conjectured that an earlier edition, of which no copies have survived, was published during Tyndale's life-time: for Foxe prints the tract along with the rest of Tyndale's works "newly imprinted according to his first copies, which he himself set forth." (Vide, Henry Walter's 'Introductory Notice' to "A Fruitful and Godly Treatise," in Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, p. 346: the S.T.C. even lists a hypothetical edition with the title of a Fruitful and Godly Treatise expressing the right institution and usage of the Sacraments, for which it suggests the date 1533.) However, in view of Foxe's report that Tyndale deliberately refrained from publishing a work on the sacraments which he had written, it is

Book' is no less equivocal. In his preface, More reproduced at some length the arguments which he had heard on both sides, without committing himself to either.

> But in the meanwhile there is come over another book against the blessed Sacrament, a book of that sort, that Fryth's book the brethren may now forbear. For more blasphemous and bedlam-ripe than this book is, were that book hard to be, which yet is mad enough as men say that have seen it. . . . The man hath not set his name unto his book, nor whose it is I cannot surely say. But some reckon it to be made by William Tyndale, for that in an epistle of his unto Fryth, he writeth that in anything he can do, he would not fail to help him forth. Howbeit some of the brethren report that the book was made by George Jay. And of truth Tyndale wrote unto Fryth that Geo. Jay had made a book against the sacrament, which was yet partly by his means, partly for lack of money retained and kept from the print. Howbeit what George Jay would do therein afterward when his money were come, that could he not, he saith, assure him. Now of truth George Jay hath long had in hand and ready lying by him his book against the sacrament. And now if this be it, he hath enlengthened it of late, by a piece that he hath patched in against me, wherein he would seem to soil mine arguments, which in my letter I made in that matter against the devilish treatise of Fryth. . . . The maker of this book for one cause why he putteth not his name thereto, writeth in this wise, 'Master Mocke, whom the verity most offendeth, and doth but mock it out, when he cannot soil it, he knoweth me well enough'. . . . Now for myself, though I know Tyndale by name, and George Jay or George Joy by name also, and twenty other fond fellows of the same sect more: yet if ten of those would make ten such foolish treatises and set their names to none, could I know thereby which of those mad fools had made which foolish book? [20]

On balance the weight of these remarks seems to be on the side of Joye's authorship, and More provides other evidence which supports the case for Joye. Later in the same preface he reports that some of the protestants, who believed that Joye was

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possible that A Fruitful and Godly Treatise was not published during his life-time, and that Stoughton's edition was, in fact, the first to appear.

[20] More, Works, pp. 1036–1037.

responsible for 'The Supper of the Lord,' were convinced that "the cause why he set not his name thereto was because he wist well that the brethren did not regard him. And Tyndale had in his letter also declared him for a fool, by reason whereof he thought that if it came out under his name the estimation thereof would be lost." [21]

Walter stated in his preface to 'The Supper of the Lord' that in spite of his professions of ignorance More took it for granted throughout the rest of his reply that the opponent he had to deal with was Tyndale.[22] But there is no evidence for this. At the end of the preface to the 'Answer,' More declared that since his antagonist had not chosen to give his name he would address him as "Master Masker," [23] and he adhered to this practice scrupulously. Apart from other considerations this enabled him to attack both Tyndale and Joye at the same time all the way through the book, on the pretext that either of them might be the person whom he had to answer.

While the evidence of More and Foxe is therefore quite compatible with Joye's authorship, other direct contemporary evidence endorses it unequivocally. Both in Bale's Catalogue of British Authors and in the proclamation of 1542 against heretical books it is stated quite explicitly that 'The Supper of the Lord' is the work of George Joye.[24]

[21] Ibid., p. 1037.

[22] Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 218.

[23] More, Works, p. 1039.

[24] Mozley suggests that Bale's attribution may have been based on the same protestant conjectures which More reported in his Answer to the First Part of a Poisoned Book (Notes and Queries. CLXXXIII, p. 305). But this is merely an hypothesis for which Mozley advances no evidence, while he completely ignores the testimony of the proclamation of 1542. The only other direct contemporary evidence also seems to support the view that The Supper of the Lord should not be ascribed to Tyndale, though it is too vague to be of much value. About 1548 The Supper of the Lord was reissued by Robert Crowley, who added a Preface to the Christian Reader. Unfortunately Crowley does not give any information about the origin of the work or the identity of its author. In his only reference to him he says "the author of this little book . . . is detested as a heretic, wherefore we may well say with Christ, 'The Light is come into the world, and men have loved darkness more than light.'" (The Supper of the Lord, London, 1548?, 'Preface to the Christian Reader.') But as Walter pointed out (Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., pp. 220–221), Crowley does not suggest that the author of The Supper of the Lord had been martyred for the faith, as he might have been expected to do had he supposed it to be the work of Tyndale. Instead the passage may imply that the author was still alive at that time, and Joye, it may be noted, did not die until

III

Such information as we have about the circumstances which led up to the publication of 'The Supper of the Lord' also supports the conclusion that it was the work of Joye, not Tyndale. For there is evidence that Tyndale was at this time opposed to any discussion of the nature of the sacrament, while Joye was only too eager to express his views on the subject.

Frith's work on the sacrament, which precipitated the controversy and which 'The Supper of the Lord' was designed to defend, was written while he was in prison on the charge of heresy. It had circulated only in manuscript, and Tyndale who was on the continent at the time did not learn of its existence until after the publication of More's reply. Shortly before the 'Letter Impugning the Erroneous Writing of John Frith' appeared, when Tyndale was still unaware that Frith had already committed himself, he wrote him the letter [25] to which More referred in the preface to his 'Answer to the First Part of a Poisoned Book.' In it Tyndale urged Frith not to make any statement of his views on the sacraments, since this would only reveal the internal divisions among the protestants and bring down on him the hostility of the Lutherans. It would be better, he advised, not to raise the issue until the protestants were in a position to settle it at leisure among themselves.

> Of the presence of Christ's body in the sacrament, meddle as little as you can, that there appear no division among us. Barnes will be hot against you. The Saxons be sure on the affirmative; whether constant or obstinate I remit it to God . . . . George Joye would have put forth a treatise of the matter, but I have stopped him as yet; what he will do if he get money I wot not. I believe he would make many reasons little serving the purpose. My mind is that nothing be put forth, till we hear how you shall have sped. I would have the right use preached, and the presence to be an indifferent thing, till the matter be reasoned at peace at leisure of

1533. But tantalizing as it is, the passage is too obscure to allow any deductions to be drawn from it.

[25] Works of Tyndale, Frith and Barnes, pp. 455–456. The letter is reprinted by Walter in his Biographical Notice, Tyndale, Doctrinal Works, pp. liii–lvi; Demaus, pp. 359–363; Mozley, pp. 248–251.

> both parties. If you be required, shew the phrases of scripture and let them talk what they will. For to believe that God is everywhere hurteth no man that worshippeth him nowhere but in the heart, in spirit and verity: even so to believe that Christ is everywhere, though it cannot be proved, hurteth no man that worshippeth him nowhere but save in the faith of his gospel. You perceive my mind; howbeit, if God shew you otherwise, it is free for you to do as he moveth you.[26]

The whole tone of this letter is cautious and statesmanlike. It fits in with Foxe's story that Tyndale deliberately refrained from publishing a work on the sacraments in case it should hinder the cause of the Gospel; and there can be no doubt that at the end of 1532 Tyndale was opposed to any action which would revive among the reformers the bitter quarrels about the nature of the real presence which had divided the Lutherans and Zwinglians for the past ten years. At the same time, the letter suggests equally clearly that Joye had no such scruples.

It therefore needs to be explained, if Tyndale is to be credited with 'The Supper of the Lord,' how he came to reverse his attitude of caution so soon. More, who had seen an intercepted copy of Tyndale's letter to Frith, pointed out that Tyndale had promised in it to do everything in his power to help Frith and he suggested that 'The Supper of the Lord' might represent Tyndale's attempt to fulfil this undertaking.[27] This explanation has been seized upon by the supporters of Tyndale's authorship. Walter went further in his preface to 'The Supper of the Lord,' and suggested that Tyndale may in addition have seen Frith's 'Answer to More' through the press in Antwerp.[28] But there is no evidence for any of this and no convincing reason why Tyndale should have acted in such a way. For even after Frith had committed himself, it still remained urgently necessary to avoid stirring up an issue which was bound to cause dissension among the protestants.

It is also not clear why Tyndale should have published the work anonymously. With the exception of some of his earlier translations from the New Testament, all Tyndale's other writings

[26] Works of Tyndale, Frith and Barnes, "Tyndale's Works," p. 455.
[27] More, Works, p. 1037.
[28] Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 220.

appeared under his own name. By 1533 he was too notorious a heretic to believe that he could protect himself in any way by concealing his name. To explain this difficulty, it has been suggested that Tyndale may have been anxious to avoid making Frith's position more difficult by espousing his cause publicly and thereby associating him with a notorious heretic.[29] But there are objections to this argument too: for 'The Supper of the Lord' was so obviously heretical that it would have been bound to incriminate Frith in any case; while the impudence of the insult to More in the final paragraph does not suggest that its author had any desire to placate the authorities.

On the other hand, there is evidence that Joye was in the habit of publishing works anonymously. Shortly afterwards he published without permission an edition of Tyndale's New Testament, which contained certain unacknowledged and questionable alterations of his own. This led to a bitter quarrel between them, in the course of which Tyndale severely criticized Joye for not giving his own name in the edition he had issued and accused him of playing "boo peep" with his readers, putting his name to some of his books and concealing it in others.[30] Unfortunately Tyndale does not mention any of Joye's other anonymous publications by name. However, he would hardly have dared to make such a charge against Joye, if he was in any danger of having it turned against himself. Joye, in fact, tried to do so but found it almost impossible. In his 'Apology to W. Tyndale' he attempted to counterattack by pointing out that Tyndale had not published his name when he first brought out his translation of the New Testament, but he does not suggest that Tyndale had adopted the same practice in any of his other works.[31] Had he had reason to believe

[29] "Whilst by writing anonymously he might intend to avoid giving Frith's judges any legal ground for convicting him of being engaged in the same conspiracy against their church with one whose works had been authoritatively described as heretical," wrote Walter in his introduction to 'The Supper of the Lord,' in Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 220. Mozley takes the same view (William Tyndale), p. 253.

[30] "But of this I challenge George Joye that he did not put his own name thereto and call it rather his own translation: and that he playeth boo peep and in some of his books putteth in his name and title and in some keepeth it out," William Tyndale, yet once more to the Christian Reader, reprinted in An Apology made by George Joye to satisfy, if it may be, W. Tyndale, edited by Edward Arber (English Scholar's Library, London, 1895), p. x.

[31] Joye, An Apology to W. Tyndale, p. 28.

that 'The Supper of the Lord' was an unacknowledged work by Tyndale, he would hardly have hesitated to bring it up against him. Instead More reported, as we have seen, that many protestants were convinced that Joye was in fact responsible for 'The Supper of the Lord,' but that he did not dare to give his name because most of them held him in such low esteem.[32]

At the same time it should be noted that no other work on the sacrament by Joye is recorded in the Short-Title Catalogue. Yet according to both Tyndale and More, Joye had a treatise ready on the sacrament at the end of 1532, which he was most anxious to have printed. There is some later evidence to suggest that he succeeded in this ambition. In 1535 Edward Foxe, Bishop of Hereford, wrote to Thomas Cromwell from Calais that he had George Joye lodging with him there: he claimed that Joye would "never again say anything contrary to the present belief concerning the sacrament," and that he was now "conformable in all points as a Christian man should be." [33] The implication of his remarks must be that in the past Joye had published heretical views on the sacrament which he was now willing to recant.[34] It is, of course, possible that the treatise of Joye's to which Tyndale referred in his letter to Frith never appeared in print. But it seems more likely that it should be identified with 'The Supper of the Lord,' or rather with a first draft of it, which was subsequently revised to serve as an answer to More's 'Letter against Frith.' [35]

[32] See above, § II.

[33] Letters and Papers — Foreign and Domestic — of the Reign of Henry VIII, edited by J. S. Brewer and James Gairdner (London, 1862–1910), VIII, 1535. No. 823. Edward Foxe to Cromwell, 4 June 1535.

[34] Mozley argues from this letter that Joye could not have been a Zwinglian, or at least not a very convinced one, since he was ready to conform in 1535, and that he could not, therefore, have written The Supper of the Lord (Notes and Queries, CLXXXIII, p. 305). But this argument misses the point of Foxe's letter: for if Bishop Foxe considered it worthwhile to report to the government that Joye had undertaken never to attack transubstantiation again, Joye must previously have been known for his heretical views on the sacrament.

[35] It should, however, be pointed out that Bale mentions two other treatises on the eucharist in his list of Joye's works — De Baptismo et Eucharistia (Incipit, 'Quia constat homo ex duabus'), which is listed in both editions of his Catalogue (1548 edition, p. 240; 1557 edition, p. 721); and De Eucharistia (Incipit, 'Haud mirandum, chari fratres) which is only mentioned in the 1557 edition (p. 721). These works are not recorded in the Short-Title Catalogue and appear to be otherwise unknown. However, Mozley suggests that the treatise mentioned in Tyndale's letter to Frith should be identified with one of these, rather than with The Supper of the Lord (Notes and Queries, CLXXXIII, p. 305).

IV

The contents of 'The Supper of the Lord' unfortunately shed only a dim light on the question of authorship. Foxe justified the inclusion of 'The Supper of the Lord' in his edition of Tyndale's works on the ground that "the method and phrase agree with" Tyndale's, and although it is possible to detect differences between it and his other writings, it is difficult to assess their significance and one may easily exaggerate their importance.

The doctrinal position expressed in 'The Supper of the Lord' is fundamentally the same as that put forward in Tyndale's 'Fruitful and Godly Treatise on the Sacraments.' Both are essentially Zwinglian in their eucharistic teaching. They deny that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is in any sense a sacrifice, since Christ's death was in itself a complete atonement for the sins of the world. They reject any form of bodily presence, even in the Lutheran sense. They insist that the phrase 'This is my body' is only to be taken metaphorically, and that the bread and wine are symbols of Christ's body and blood but do not contain them in any form.[36]

Nevertheless there are certain differences of attitude to be found in the two works. In the 'Fruitful and Godly Treatise' Tyndale puts forward the Zwinglian position in its most extreme form. He emphasizes that the sacrament is essentially a 'memorial': it was instituted to testify to Christ's sacrifice on the cross and its main purpose is to keep people in remembrance of this. In consequence the general tendency of the treatise is to minimize the importance of the eucharist. The tone in which it is written is depreciatory. In discussing the nature of the sacrament he uses the word 'only' and 'merely' with great frequency. Thus he remarks that "the sacraments are bodies of stories only; and that there is none other virtue in them than to testify and exhibit to the senses the covenants and promises made in Christ's blood." [37] Elsewhere to demonstrate their secondary rôle, he insists that

[36] To appreciate the similarity of their eucharistic doctrine both treatises should be read in their entirety. Nevertheless one may compare the following passages especially: — 'The Supper of the Lord' in Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 237 et seq., pp. 242–243, p. 251: 'A Fruitful and Godly Treatise,' in Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, pp. 357–359, p. 365 et seq.

[37] Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, pp. 357–358.

preaching alone is necessary for salvation, and that the sacraments could if necessary be dispensed with.[38]

The author of 'The Supper of the Lord' appears to have a more profound and mystical conception of the sacrament. "This is no small sacrament," he declares, "nor yet irreverently to be entreated; but it is the most glorious and highest sacrament, with all reverence and worship, with thanksgiving, to be ministered, used, received, preached, and solemnly in the face of the congregation to be celebrated." [39] At the same time it is not merely a memorial of Christ's sacrifice: it is also a sacrament of Christian unity, a token of "the unity and communion of our hearts, glued unto the whole body of Christ in love." [40] By participating in the Lord's Supper, the Christian shows that he is incorporated in Christ's Church.[41]

On one point, however, there is a considerable difference between 'The Supper of the Lord' and the rest of Tyndale's writings. 'The Supper of the Lord' concludes with an appeal to the magistrate, as head of the church, to cause the gospel to be preached purely and to introduce the true form of celebrating the Lord's Supper. "Would God the secular princes, which should be the very pastors and head rulers of their congregations, committed unto their care, would first command or suffer the true preachers of God's word to preach the gospel purely and plainly, with discreet liberty, and constitute over each particular parish such curates as can and would preach the word, and that once or twice in the week, appointing unto their flock certain days, after their discretion and zeal to God-ward, to come together to celebrate the Lord's Supper." [42] Such an appeal to the civil authority to intervene in the affairs of the church has no parallel in the authenticated writings of Tyndale. Contrary to the general opinion, the belief that the magistrate had an *ex officio* responsibility for the reform of the church was not an integral part of protestant thought. Luther

[38] "Neither our salvation so greatly standeth in that or in any other sacrament, that we would not be saved without them, by preaching the word only." Ibid., p. 359.

[39] Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., pp. 250–251.

[40] Ibid., p. 246.

[41] Ibid., p. 246.

[42] Ibid., p. 265.

for a long time insisted that the magistrate was not in any way concerned with matters of faith: [43] even after 1527, when he finally accepted the necessity for electoral intervention in the Saxon church, he was careful to point out that the elector could only act as a private Christian and not in virtue of any authority conferred on him by his temporal position.[44] Tyndale who, except in his sacramental beliefs, was profoundly influenced by Luther's teaching, seems to have followed him in not conferring any ecclesiastical functions on the king. Even in 'The Obedience of a Christian Man' there is no suggestion that the king has any duties in regard to the reform of the church. If 'The Supper of the Lord' were the work of Tyndale it would represent a complete revision of his earlier attitude towards the relations of church and state.[45]

In spite of Foxe's assertions to the contrary there are also some remarkable differences of method and phraseology between 'The Supper of the Lord' and Tyndale's other works. As Henry Walter pointed out,[46] 'The Supper of the Lord' does not contain a single example of the references to the original languages of the Bible, especially Hebrew, with which Tyndale's works normally abound; nor does it make much use of the Old Testament. Yet the 'Fruitful and Godly Treatise' begins by declaring that "to understand the pith of the sacraments, how they came up, and the very meaning of them, we must consider diligently the manners and fashions of the Hebrews," [47] and large sections of it are devoted to describing Old Testament covenants and the signs by which they were confirmed, with erudite discussions of Hebrew etymologies.[48] Even in the brief section on the sacraments in the 'Answer to

[43] The most complete statement of Luther's position is to be found in Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit (1523).

[44] Preface to Melanchthon's Instructions for the Visitors of the Saxon Church (1527), Martin Luther, Werke (Weimar, 1883–), XXVI, p. 197.

[45] It is always possible that Tyndale had changed his mind on this point by 1533, as The Obedience of a Christian Man was written in 1528. Nevertheless even in the political sections of the Exposition of Matthew V, VI and VII, which appeared in 1532 (Tyndale, Expositions of Scripture — Parker Society, Cambridge 1849 — especially pp. 58–70), there is no suggestion that the Christian magistrate is *ex officio* head of the church.

[46] Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 220. Mozley, however, questions the force of this argument, Notes and Queries, CLXXXIII, p. 306.

[47] Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, p. 347.

[48] Ibid., especially pp. 347–354, 375–378.

More,' Tyndale suggests that the word Mass is derived from the Hebrew *Misach*.[49] By contrast 'The Supper of the Lord' does not contain a single Hebrew quotation and apart from the conventional statement that the christian sacraments had Old Testament prototypes in the rites of circumcision and the passover, the Old Testament is completely ignored, the main part of the argument being based on the New Testament and the Fathers.

Arguments from style are notoriously unsatisfactory and it would probably be impossible to establish conclusively that 'The Supper of the Lord' differs from Tyndale's normal manner of writing. Nevertheless it contains a number of usages which seem to me to be more characteristic of Joye than Tyndale. Thus the eucharist is never described explicitly as a 'memorial,' as it is in both the 'Fruitful and Godly Treatise' and the 'Answer to More.'[50] Throughout 'The Supper of the Lord' Augustine is regularly referred to as 'Austin,' and this is the characteristic practice of Joye's 'Apology to W. Tyndale' and his 'Subversion of More's False Fortress.' Tyndale, however, invariably uses the form 'Augustine.' In addition, the author of 'The Supper of the Lord' is in the habit of appealing frequently to the "Christian reader," and this form of address is hardly ever varied. In the 'Apology' whenever Joye addresses the reader it is always as the "Christian Reader." While Tyndale was also in the habit of apostrophizing his public, he did not adopt a uniform practice; sometimes he refers to the "Christian reader," sometimes to the "godly reader," the "faithful reader" or even just the "reader." A closer examination of the works of both Tyndale and Joye would probably reveal other differences of a similar kind.

These discrepancies might not be a sufficient reason in themselves for denying Tyndale's authorship, but taken in conjunction with the other arguments they assume a much greater importance. In the light of the contemporary evidence there can be little doubt that 'The Supper of the Lord' should be attributed to George Joye and not to William Tyndale.

[49] Tyndale, Answer to More, &c., p. 177.
[50] Cf. especially Doctrinal Treatises, p. 371; Answer to More, &c., p. 177.

THE DEBATE ON THE LOYAL SACRIFICES, A.D. 66

A turning-point in the history of Judaea in the first century was the rejection, some time in the summer of 66, of the daily sacrifice that had been offered for many years past in honor of the Emperor; this was tantamount to the repudiation of allegiance to Rome, and thus marked the beginning of the Great Revolt. The Talmud (T. B. Giṭṭin 56a) has a legendary account of this episode, which it associates with a quarrel between two citizens of Jerusalem bearing the improbable names of Kamṣa and Bar Kamṣa, the latter ultimately figuring in the rôle of *agent provocateur* and informer. Possibly, the name conceals in garbled form some personality of the period known to us from other sources, but thus far it has been impossible to identify him.[1]

Josephus on the other hand gives a detailed and plausible account of what took place at the time. It was the fiery Eleazar ben Ḥananiah, Captain of the Temple, who he says "persuaded those who officiated in the Temple services to accept no gift or sacrifice from a foreigner" (Wars, ii. 409). Apparently, then, whatever Eleazar's actual intentions (although not a Zealot, as he is so often described, he had obviously fallen under the influence of Zealot teaching) his proposals were couched in general terms and did not ostensibly have any political implication. Nevertheless, the outcome was obvious: "this action laid the foundation of the war against the Romans: for the sacrifices offered on behalf of that nation and of the Emperor were in consequence rejected."

By this time, these offerings had been an established institution for approximately a century (with some inevitable interludes when the Roman rule was in eclipse), having first been instituted according to Philo (Legatio ad Caium, § 157, 317) by Augustus. They consisted of two lambs and a bull, offered twice daily (Josephus, Wars, ii. 197), morning and afternoon. According to Josephus, the expense was borne by the Jewish people (Contra Apionem, ii. 77), though Philo, ostensibly supported by the talmudical account cited above, states that the Emperor paid for the sacrifices out of his privy purse.

However this may be, Eleazar's position as Captain of the Temple, and his consequent authority with the younger priesthood, gave him special influence. Notwithstanding the opposition of the "Chief priests

[1] Identity has been suggested with the pro-Roman citizens of Tiberias, Compsus and his son of the same name, presumably known as Compsus bar Compsus (Josephus, Vita, §33), but it is far from convincing; neither the geographical setting nor the circumstances correspond.

and notables" (and in particular, according to the romanticized talmudical picture, of the Pharisee "sages") his proposals carried the day. The leaders of the moderate and pro-Roman element in Jerusalem — "the principal citizens . . . with the chief priests and the most notable Pharisees" — now came together to consider the crisis (Wars, ii. 411). They determined to appeal above the heads of Eleazar and his adherents to the general body of the people, in whose hands ultimate authority was considered to reside.[2] Accordingly, a mass-meeting of citizens was summoned in the Temple Court, in front of the bronze gate of the Inner Sanctuary, facing eastwards. The matter was now publicly debated.

In the course of the discussions, we are told, "priestly experts on the traditions" were called on to express their opinion. No doubt after consulting the records and verifying the recollections of their more aged colleagues, they deposed that "all their ancestors had accepted the sacrifices of aliens." In other words, relying on precedent in the accepted fashion, they declared that to refuse sacrifice offered by or for non-Jews would be contrary to established usage. No doubt, however, contrary views, not reported by the Romanophile historian, were also expressed by some of these "priestly experts," who may be assumed to have comprised in their number some who were Pharisees.[3] Indeed, Josephus himself (Contra Apionem, ii. 77) states emphatically that the loyal sacrifice was wholly exceptional in Jewish usage. This in itself implies that, strictly speaking, it was to some extent irregular, and could hence have been considered as improper by rigorists, who are unlikely to have been backward in expressing their views.

Josephus reports also at some length the general tenor of the arguments put forward by the loyalist elements. First, they maintained that the sacrifices should be continued on grounds of precedent: for their forefathers had always accepted gifts from foreigners, the Temple being adorned by dedicatory offerings made by non-Jews (though to be sure this did not prove that they had been permitted to offer sacrifice); then on grounds of prudence, because the repudiation of sacrifice would inevitably lead to war; and finally on grounds of religion, for the city would lay itself open to the charge of impiety, and Judaism to one of deplorable exclusiveness, if the new regulations were put into force. (Wars, ii. 411–8.)

We have Josephus' express statement as well as the talmudic authority

[2] I am endeavoring to deal with this, the constitutional aspect of the Revolution of 66, in a separate paper.

[3] We will revert to this later: meanwhile, it may be noted that of the two priests who were on the Commission of Enquiry sent to Galilee in 68 to investigate the charges against Josephus, one was a Pharisee (Vita, §197).

for the fact that Pharisee scholars took a leading part in these deliberations, throwing their weight mainly on the loyalist side. It appears possible that there are echoes of the debate in the talmudic literature, in statements reported in the name of contemporary Pharisee scholars which bear at least obliquely on this problem. Even if these were not actual contributions to the debate, they reflect the opinions and outlook of those who certainly took part in it.

The most distinguished of them, at this time, was Simon ben Gamaliel, the President of the Pharisaic court and leading member of the future Patriarchal family. He must necessarily have played a prominent rôle in the negotiations and deliberations during this period of crisis, but if he lived up to his own recommendations would have taken as inconspicuous a part as possible in the public discussions. "All my days have I grown up among the wise," he is reported to have said ('Abhoth, i. 9), "and I have found nought better[4] than silence. . . . Whoso is profuse of words causeth sin." In accordance with this principle, he would certainly have refused to commit himself at the time of the crisis which we are now considering. Had he declared himself in favor of the continuation of the loyal sacrifices, he would have lost the sympathy of the ardently patriotic among the population, now influenced more and more by Zealot leaders. If on the other hand he decided against the conventional expression of loyalty, he would have endangered his position with the Roman authorities and the Herodian house and the pacific elements with whom the affinities of the Pharisees traditionally lay. It would have therefore been natural, if not indeed politic, for him to have lived up now to his own recommendations and shown himself reticent and noncommittal. He appears indeed in Josephus' picture in quite a different light, during the political crisis of 68 when the Zealots were assuming control, as throwing his weight into the scales against them and making public addresses before the assemblies (Wars, iv. 159). But by then he had for some while been compelled by necessity to take a prominent part in political life, and his general attitude may have changed.[5] If in 66 he had expressed himself in a positive fashion or with any vigor, the historian, who so highly esteemed his character and ability, would not have failed to mention the fact.

[4] "To the body" is added, a little perplexingly, in the Hebrew, almost suggesting that he considered this course to be dictated by physical prudence.

[5] It is conceivable that the Pharisaic Gezeroth banning certain Gentile products &c., apparently aimed at cutting off relations between Jews and non-Jews and believed to have been promulgated at this period, are evidence of an attempt by the Pharisee scholars to regain the influence among the patriotic elements which had been lost by their failure to give a definite lead at the outbreak of the Revolution.

Second to him in importance was R. Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who was to be mainly responsible for perpetuating the tradition of the Pharisaic academies after the fall of Jerusalem. He figures in later Jewish tradition as the type of the Pharisee pacifist, but there were elements of activism and even of Zealot teaching in his thought. Indeed, in relation to this problem he put forward, possibly on this very occasion, what was in effect a tactfully-conceived and highly statesmanlike compromise view. Moral goodness atones for the Gentiles, just as sacrifice atones for Israel, he is reported to have said (T. B. Babha Bathra 10b). The logical sequel was that even if sacrifice from non-Jews were refused, this should not be considered a slight on those who desired to make the offering, nor did it imply as was averred the repudiation of allegiance. On the other hand, it appears that R. Yoḥanan agreed on general principles with those who considered such sacrifice to be unnecessary or even, possibly, undesirable.

As regards this last point, however, R. Yoḥanan found himself in diametrical opposition to Ḥananiah, the suffragan High Priest (Seghan ha-Kohanim), whose office shows that he must have flourished before 70, although he survived to testify during the formative period of the Mishnah regarding temple practices and former conditions in Judaea. This fact is sufficient to demonstrate that he too was a Pharisee. In his view, the repudiation of allegiance would lead to anarchy. "Pray for the welfare of the Empire," he recommended ('Abhoth, iii. 3): "But for the fear thereof, men would swallow one another alive." Certainly, this aphorism must date back to the period before the outbreak of war, after which it would have been grimly ironic; and at this time prayer and sacrifice would naturally have been associated. On the other hand, there is some evidence that at one time R. Ḥananiah accepted the Zealot creed, for he bitterly blamed the action of the Town Councils in Judaea (*βουλάι*) which repudiated the yoke of God and accepted in its place the sovereignty of flesh and blood ('Abhoth de R. Nathan, A, xx).[6]

Another Pharisee scholar who took part in the debates was Zachariah ben Amphicalleus, who figures in the account of Josephus (Wars, iv. 225) as one of the leaders of the Zealots who entrenched themselves in the

[6] This can hardly imply the Roman conquest (or reconquest) by force of arms, but might conceivably be a reference to the events of 68/9, when this area defected from the Zealots and docilely submitted to the personal rule of Simon bar Giora. However that may be, the two statements ascribed to R. Ḥananiah stand in obvious contradiction one to the other. Unless the ascription is incorrect, we must assume a change of attitude on his part: opposing the Revolution at the outset, he may have accepted it later *de facto*, as has often been the case at other times in similar circumstances.

Temple at a later stage of the Revolution. The talmudic tradition knows nothing of this but only of the participation of R. Zachariah ben ''Abhkulas' in the debates in the summer of 66 (T. B. Giṭṭin 56). The legendary Bar Kamṣa referred to above is said to have brought to the Temple in the Emperor's name with malicious intent a blemished animal unfit for sacrifice, correctly anticipating that it would be rejected and thus give rise to a charge of disloyalty. In view of the circumstances the "sages" were prepared to make an exception, and accept it at the altar: but the meticulous R. Zachariah (whom we know from Josephus to have been in fact a Priest) fought bitterly and successfully against this. Clearly, then, the "Priestly experts on traditions" were not unanimous in their pro-Roman attitude.[7]

Cecil Roth

Oxford, England

[7] The Talmud states that R. Zachariah was responsible for saving the traitor from the punishment which he deserved: this is indeed at variance with the accepted picture of Zealot ruthlessness.